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A CRUMBLING PYRAMID: HOW
THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE
DEFINING 'EMPLOYEE' UNDER
THE ADEA THREATENS THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN
LARGE LAW FIRM
Jessica Fink*
I. INTRODUCTION
The private practice of law today looks quite different than it did just a
few decades ago. For one thing, the size of law firms has changed.
Previously, law partnerships consisted of relatively small, close-knit firms
in which attorneys made business decisions in a collaborative manner.2
However, with the rise of "mega-firms" in the past few decades, law
partnerships now might consist of hundreds or even thousands of attorneys,
many of whom have never even met.3 Moreover, the demographic makeup
of the lawyers working within these firms also differs from that of previous
generations: not only have women and minorities entered the profession in
rising numbers, but also the average age of attorneys within firms has
increased, as many attorneys have continued working well past the age
when previous generations retired.'
These changes have created a variety of practical and legal concerns
for law firms and the attorneys who work there. Specifically, firms have
struggled with how to encourage the regular turnover among lawyers when
Assistant Professor, California Western School of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues at
California Western who provided me with valuable feedback at a work-in-progress session regarding
this Article. I owe a special thank you to William Aceves and Ruben Garcia, each of whom reviewed
an earlier draft of this work and provided helpful comments and suggestions, and to Meredith Callan,
Kevin Weichbrod and Katharine Wolfrom, the students who provided research assistance on this
project.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See id.
4. See infra Part II.B. 1.
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older partners choose not to "exit gracefully" upon reaching retirement
age.' Complicating matters further, U.S. Supreme Court and lower court
decisions have made clear that firms which force older partners out of a
partnership, or otherwise take adverse action against such partners, might
face liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
These decisions turn upon a finding that older partners might be
characterized as employees who are covered by federal antidiscrimination
laws, instead of as owners who fall outside of the ADEA's protections.
When deciding whether a partner qualifies as an employee for
purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, recent cases place substantial
emphasis on a partner's relative power and control within his or her firm.
This emphasis on a partner's power and control, creates complications for
many modem large law firms. Such significant firm features as the length
of the partnership track for incoming associates, to the percentage of firm
profits that partners receive, to the level of turnover among older partners
all may be affected by how the courts have defined the distinction between
partners and employees.' This article explores some of the complications
created by this evolving jurisprudence, and proposes some potential ways
in which firms can comply with the letter and spirit of the ADEA while still
maintaining internal structures that ensure productivity and profitability.
Part I of this article describes the legal framework for analyzing
whether a partner can sue under the ADEA, focusing on two fairly recent
decisions in this area: (i) The U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells,' a case in which the
Court had to determine whether director-shareholder physicians in a
medical clinic should be deemed employees for purposes of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA");' and (ii) the Seventh Circuit's 2002
decision in a lawsuit brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") against the law firm Sidley & Austin ("Sidley"),9
in which the agency alleged an age discrimination claim on behalf of 32
5. See infra Part I.B.3. For purposes of this Article, "older partners" refers to those individuals
within a firm who are most senior in terms of their age. While this Article assumes that "older
partners" always will be over 40 years old, the exact age of such individuals may vary from firm to
firm, but generally will include individuals who are close to reaching or already have reached the
traditional retirement age of 65 years old.
6. While this article focuses on how law partnerships are affected by these legal and social
developments, other types of similarly-structured business entities-such as physician practice groups
comprised of doctor-shareholders- may face challenges similar to those described herein. Although a
discussion of these other types of business entities falls outside the scope of this Article, many of the
proposals discussed below likely would apply with equal force in these other contexts.
7. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102; 12111-12117 (2008).
9. Following the commencement of the EEOC's investigation, Sidley & Austin merged with the
firm Brown & Wood, and briefly operated under the name Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. The firm
currently operates under the name Sidley Austin LLP. See Sidley Austin, LLP, www.sidley.com/
ourfirm/history (last visited Nov. 8 2009).
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demoted former equity partners in the finn.'o While several years have
passed since the courts rendered these decisions, recent developments
within the legal community, combined with current economic conditions,
have exacerbated significantly the impact of these cases. Part I discusses
the holdings of these two cases, describe some of the reactions within the
legal community to these two cases, and highlight some potential concerns
regarding the outcomes in these cases, particularly when applied to the
modem large law firm.
Because this article focuses on the impact of Clackamas and Sidley on
law firms, particularly the larger ones, Part II sets forth an analysis of the
modem large law firm, describing how modem firms have evolved in terms
of their hierarchy, demography, goals and objectives. Part II focuses in
particular on recent changes within the structure and culture of large law
firms and discusses the impact that these changes might have on firm
lawyers.
Part III begins to bring together the above information, describing in
greater detail how cases like Clackamas and Sidley might undermine the
operations of modem large law firms. Part III will discuss some of the
specific steps that firms may take in response to these cases and will
describe how those steps might impact lawyers in a firm.
Finally, Part IV proposes some solutions to this dilemma, suggesting
ways in which law firms might provide partners with the protections
potentially required by Clackamas and Sidley, while still running their
firms in an effective, efficient, and profitable manner.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A PARTNER'S
ABILITY TO SUE UNDER THE ADEA
A. GENERAL LANDSCAPE FOR ANALYZING "EMPLOYEE" STATUS UNDER
FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
Various federal antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")," the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"),12 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
10. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315
F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). The author worked as an associate for Sidley's Chicago office from 2001
until 2006. While the author conducted some research related to issues discussed in this Article during
her employment with Sidley, she was not involved directly in the litigation between Sidley and the
EEOC.
I1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)(17) (2008), amended by CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a) (2005).
12. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440.
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("ADEA")" bar discrimination on the basis of certain protected
characteristics in the workplace. When such alleged discrimination arises
in the workplace, these laws permit employees to sue their employers for
claimed violations of these federal laws.14 None of these statutes, however,
provides any meaningful definition of the term "employee." Rather, each
statute in virtually identical terms defines an employee who will be
protected under the act as "an individual employed by an employer.""
This circular definition of the term employee has led to questions
regarding precisely who is covered by these laws, i.e., questions regarding
who can bring a claim alleging unlawful discrimination in the workplace.
One particularly vexing question that has faced many courts is whether
individuals designated as "partners" in their firms can bring suits alleging
violations of these antidiscrimination laws. Faced with scant statutory
guidance regarding who should be deemed an employee for these purposes,
and with little legislative history to resolve this concern,' the federal courts
largely have been left to their own devices in defining whether "partners"
can sue under these laws.
1. Tests Applied by the Federal Courts to Determine Whether a Partner
Can Sue under Federal Antidiscrimination Laws
Many scholars and practitioners already have analyzed the various
approaches taken by the federal courts for defining who is an employee for
purposes of federal antidiscrimination law and for determining whether
"partners" fall into this category." Some courts have adopted a per se rule
in these cases, holding that anyone proven to be a general partner in a firm
according to state partnership law would be barred from bringing a federal
antidiscrimination claim." In Burke v. Friedman,9 for example, the
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2005) [hereinafter "ADEA"].
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(1)-(2),(b)(5); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
16. Stephanie M. Greene and Christine Neylon O'Brien, Partners and Shareholders as Covered
Employees Under Federal Antidiscrimination Acts, 40 AM. Bus. L. J. 781,786 (2003) (citations
omitted).
17. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Partner Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120
HARv. L. REv. 1264 (2007) [hereinafter "Partner Shmartner!"]; Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or
Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as "Employees" Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57
SMU L. REv. 3 (2004); Greene & O'Brien, supra note 16; Stephanie Greene and Christine Neylon
O'Brien, Who Counts? The United States Supreme Court Cites "Control" as the Key to Distinguishing
Employers from Employees Under Federal Employment Antidiscrimination Laws,, 2003 COLUM. Bus.
L. REv. 761 (2003) [hereinafter "Who Counts?"]); Joel Bannister, Comment, In Search of a Title: When
Should Partners be Considered "Employees "for Purposes of Federal Employment Antidiscrimination
Statutes?, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 257 (2004); Catherine Lovly & Matthew Mehnert, Note, Something
Every Lawyer Needs to Know: The Employer-Employee Distinction in the Modern law Firm, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 663 (2004); Kristin Nicole Johnson, Note, Resolving the Title VII Partner-
Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1067 (2003).
18. See Bannister, supra note 17, at 263-66 (citations omitted); Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 17, at
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a partner in an accounting
firm could not be deemed an employee for purposes of Title VII.20
Looking almost exclusively to the definitions of partnership articulated in
the Uniform Partnership Act and to decisions interpreting that statute, the
court held that partners in general partnerships were not employees, but
rather were "employers who own[ed] and manage[d] the operations of the
business."2 1
The Eleventh Circuit echoed this view in Hishon v. King & Spalding.22
Citing with approval the Seventh Circuit's decision in Burke, the court
echoed the Seventh Circuit's "hesitation to equate partners with
employees,"23 finding a "clear distinction between employees of a
corporation and partners of a law firm."24 Although the Supreme Court
later reversed this decision, finding that the plaintiff could maintain a claim
under Title VII,25 Justice Powell's often-cited concurrence in Hishon
cautioned that the Court's decision "should not be read as extending Title
VII to the management of a law firm by its partners," 26 emphasizing the
significant differences between law partners on the one hand, and
employers and employees on the other hand.27
In contrast to this per se rule for excluding partners from the coverage
of federal antidiscrimination laws, other courts adopted a more flexible
''economic realities test" for determining whether individuals would fall
within the protection of these laws.28 Courts adhering to this economic
realities approach would not rely solely on the titles of the individuals in
question to determine whether they are covered by antidiscrimination law,
but rather would focus on the function that such individuals performed
within the business entity in question.29 In the context of a partnership,
therefore, a court would not rely simply upon an individual's denomination
as a partner to deem him or her excluded from coverage of
678-81 (citations omitted); see also Greene and O'Brien, Who Counts?, supra note 17, at 767-72
(referring to this approach as the "corporate form" approach, which determines one's status as an
employee "solely by virtue of the selected form of doing business").
19. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
20. While Burke employed this analysis to determine whether the defendant employed a sufficient
number of employees to be deemed a sufficiently large "employer" for coverage under Title VII, courts
have applied the same analysis to defining "employee" for purposes of employer-coverage as for
employee-coverage. See, e.g., Greene and O'Brien, Who Counts?, supra note 17, at 768.
21. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869 (footnote omitted).
22. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982).
23. Id. at 1028.
24. Id.
25. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 79-80.
28. Bannister, supra note 17, at 266-68; see also Greene and O'Brien, Who Counts?, supra note
17, at 767-72.
29. Greene and O'Brien, Who Counts?, supra note 17, at 767.
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antidiscrimination laws, but rather would examine factors such as the
relationship among partners in the firm, including the amount of power an
individual partner actually possesses to formulate firm policies and make
decisions in the firm. 30
2. The EEOC's Approach
In addition to the tests used by the federal courts for determining when
a partner can sue under federal antidiscrimination laws, the EEOC has
provided some guidance of its own regarding when an individual should be
deemed a "covered employee" for purposes of such laws.
The EEOC's Compliance Manual acknowledges that "[i]n most
circumstances, individuals who are partners, officers, members of boards of
directors, or major shareholders will not qualify as employees."31
However, the Compliance Manual goes on to make clear that "[a]n
individual's title . . . does not determine whether the individual is a partner,
officer, member of a board of directors, or major shareholder, as opposed to
an employee,"32 and advises that an EEOC investigator "should determine
whether the individual acts independently and participates in managing the
organization, or whether the individual is subject to the organization's
control. If the individual is subject to the organization's control, s/he is an
employee."3 3 Moreover, the Compliance Manual sets forth specific factors
that the investigator should consider in this respect:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the
rules and regulations of the individual's work[;]
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the
individual's work[;]
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization[;]
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to
influence the organization[;]
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee,
as expressed in written agreements or contracts[; and]
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities
of the organization.34
30. McGinley, supra note 17, at 18 (citation omitted).
31. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,EEOC Compliance Manual, § 2-Ill(A)(1)(d),
(2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.htmi (last visited Aug. 18 2009) (citation
omitted).
32. Id.
33. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 31
34. Id.
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Thus, while the EEOC's test begins with a presumption against
characterizing a partner as an employee," it allows for the possibility that
individuals with the title of partner might be deemed employees for
purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, if these six factors weigh in
favor of such a conclusion.
B. THE ISSUE OF DEFINING "EMPLOYEE" REACHES THE SUPREME
COURT: CLACKAMAS GASTROENTEROLOGYASSOC., P.C. V. WELLS
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells. While not addressing the precise
issue of when partners should be deemed employees for purposes of
federal antidiscrimination laws, this case has had a profound impact on
lower courts' analysis of this issue. In Clackamas, Deborah Wells, a
bookkeeper and full-time employee of Clackamas Gastroenterology, sued
her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In defending
against Ms. Wells' suit, Clackamas claimed that it lacked a sufficient
number of employees to fall within the coverage of the ADA. 8
Specifically, Clackamas argued that the four physician-shareholders who
owned the medical clinic and who constituted its board of directors should
not be deemed employees for purposes of this statute.
After reviewing the tests that various lower courts had adopted on this
point, the Supreme Court adopted the six factors suggested by the EEOC
for determining an individual's employment status.40 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that "the common law element of control is the principal
guidepost that should be followed in this case." 41 In other words, while the
Court would apply each of the EEOC's six factors to the physician
director-shareholders to decide whether the director-shareholders seemed
more like owners or employees, a primary consideration would be the
amount of control that each director-shareholder exerted over the business
as a whole.42
35. McGinley, supra note 17, at 18.
36. Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440.
37. Id. at 442.
38. See id. The ADA generally defines "employers" covered by the statute as those having "15 or
more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 121 ll(5)(A).
39. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442. See supra note 19 (courts have applied a similar approach to
defining the term "employee" for purposes of "counting" employees to determine employer-coverage).
40. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-50.
41. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
42. This article does not focus on the reasoning behind the Clackamas decision, but rather
concentrates on some of the unanticipated potential consequences of that decision. For a more detailed
analysis of the background to this case and the Court's reasoning in issuing this significant decision, see
generally McGinley, supra note 17; Lovly and Mehnert, supra note 17; Greene & O'Brien, supra note
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While the Court's decision in Clackamas did not focus on how
partners should be classified for purposes of federal antidiscrimination
laws, the Court, like the EEOC, emphasized that merely designating an
individual with a particular title (i.e., partner) would not in and of itself
exclude that individual from the coverage of these statutes. 43 Indeed, the
Court observed that "[t]oday there are partnerships that include hundreds of
members, some of whom may well qualify as 'employees' because control
is concentrated in a small number of managing partners."" Thus, the Court
made clear that someone might possess the title of "partner," but still be
deemed an employee for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law, if he
or she lacked sufficient control over certain aspects of the partnership. In
this respect, the Court's opinion in Clackamas sounded a warning to law
firms all over the United States-particularly to large firms where many
partners possessed limited power and control-that the status of such
putative "partners" in these firms might be uncertain for purposes of federal
antidiscrimination laws.
C. APPLYING CLACKAMAS TO THE LARGE LAW FIRM: EEOC V. SIDLEY
AUSTINBROWN& WOOD
Clackamas made clear that neither an entity's status as a "partnership"
nor an individual's designation as a partner would automatically bar the
partner from bringing a discrimination claim against the firm under federal
law. This decision, however, created significant uncertainty for many law
firms, particularly those that seemed to fit the description about which the
Clackamas Court had warned-i.e., those with "hundreds of members,"
where "control is concentrated in a small number of managing partners."4
Were a significant number of partners in such firms employees for purposes
of federal antidiscrimination law? If so, how might that affect the way in
which large law firms were structured? As it turned out, at the same time
that the Court issued its decision in Clackamas, another case that
potentially could answer these questions was making its way through the
courts.
1. The EEOC's Lawsuit Against Sidley Austin Brown & Wood
In 1999, the law firm then known as Sidley Austin Brown & Wood,
17; Bannister, supra note 17.
43. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual) ("The mere fact that a
person has a particular title-such as partner, director, or vice president-should not necessarily be
used to determine whether he or she is an employee or a proprietor").
44. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
45. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 446.
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now known as Sidley Austin LLP4 6 demoted 32 of its equity partners to the
status of "counsel" or "senior counsel." 47 Each of these demoted partners
apparently was over 40 years of age, and the EEOC subsequently
commenced an investigation to determine whether these demotions might
have violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.48 As part of its
investigation, the EEOC requested certain information from Sidley-some
of which Sidley provided, and some of which Sidley declined to provide.49
In declining to provide some of the information requested by the
EEOC, Sidley argued that the EEOC only was entitled to information
which made clear that the agency lacked a jurisdictional basis for its
investigation." Specifically, Sidley argued that it needed only to provide
the EEOC with sufficient information to establish that the 32 demoted
individuals had been "bona fide" partners prior to their demotions, and
therefore did not fall within the protections of the ADEA."'
Sidley had some facts to support its argument that these demoted
individuals had been true "partners" in the firm: each demoted individual
previously had held the title of "partner."52 In addition, each previously
had maintained a capital account with the firm, averaging approximately
$400,000,"3 and each had been responsible for the firm's liabilities, in
proportion to his capital contribution in the firm.54 Moreover, firm
partners, including these demoted individuals, could commit the firm in
certain respects, such as by writing opinion letters,ss and had various
powers with respect to the hiring, firing, promotion and compensation of
subordinate attorneys.
In other respects, however, the structure at Sidley differed
significantly from traditional notions of law firm partnership: unlike the
tightly knit, closely held law partnerships that existed in the profession in
earlier years, Sidley had ballooned to almost 900 lawyers worldwide by
1999, 400 of whom held the title of "partner."" Virtually all of the power
within the firm resided within a 36-member, unelected, self-perpetuating
46. See supra note 9.
47. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 698.
48. See id.at 698.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 699.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 703.
56. Id.
57. See The National Law Journal's Annual Listing of the Nation's Largest Law Firms, NAT'L
L.J., DEC. 31, 1999, at C3, (cot. 1). By 2002, when the 7th Circuit issued its decision in Sidley, the firm
had grown to include over 1,500 lawyers nationwide, 500 of whom were partners in the firm. See The
NIJ250, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 18, 2002, at C4, (cot. 1); Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 703.
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executive committee." Executive committee members could fire, promote
or demote other partners, increase or decrease other partners'
compensation, and controlled the various committees within the firm." In
this respect, Sidley's structure bore little resemblance to the vision of
partnership that Justice Powell had described two decades earlier in his
concurrence in Hishon: "The essence of the law partnership is the common
conduct of a shared enterprise. The relationship among law partners
contemplates that decisions important to the partnership normally will be
made by common agreement . . . or consent among the partners."6 0  Such
"common agreement" or "consent among partners" simply would be
impossible in a firm with the size and structure of Sidley.
Eventually, the dispute regarding the status of these demoted
individuals made its way into court, with the EEOC filing a motion to
enforce a subpoena for the disputed information with the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.6' Following the district court's
order that Sidley comply in full with the EEOC's subpoena, Sidley
appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 62
In writing for the Majority in this case, Judge Richard Posner found
enough doubt regarding the status of these 32 demoted partners to require
Sidley to provide information that related to the "coverage" portion of the
subpoena-i.e., required Sidley to provide information necessary to
determine whether the 32 demoted partners qualified as employees for
purposes of the ADEA. Judge Posner made clear that mere compliance
with the formalities of state partnership law would not automatically
exempt these demoted individuals from the coverage of the ADEA.6
Indeed, Judge Posner acknowledged that Sidley qualified as a true
partnership, and that these 32 individuals technically were "partners" under
applicable state partnership law.65 However, the more important question
from Judge Posner's perspective involved whether these individuals had
the means available to them, by virtue of their partnership status, to protect
themselves against discrimination by the firm. 6 Judge Posner
characterized the 32 demoted partners in this case as "defenseless" against
58. Id. at 699.
59. Id.
60. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80.
61. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 698-99.
62. Id.
63. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 700; see also Leonard Bierman and Rafael Gely, So
You Want to be a Partner at Sidley & Austin, 40 Hous. L. REV. 969, 974 (2003) (citations omitted).
64. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 701.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 704 ("If implicit in the ADEA's exemption for employers is recognition that partners
ordinarily have adequate remedies under partnership law to protect themselves against oppression
(including age or other forms of invidious discrimination) by the partnership, then exposure to liability
[for debts of the firm] can hardly be decisive.").
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discrimination by the firm, arguing that "they had no power over their
fate."" Because Judge Posner viewed these individuals as having little
protection against oppression by the firm, he refused to conclude that their
status as partners under state law precluded their status as employees for
purposes of federal discrimination law."
Thus, Judge Posner seemed to believe that an essential factor in
determining a partner's "employment status" was the amount of power and
control that the putative partner exercised within the firm as a whole. In
other words, the Seventh Circuit seemed to apply with full force Supreme
Court's admonition in Clackamas that "the common law element of control
is the principal guidepost that should be followed in this case."69 Even
John Hendrickson, the EEOC's Chicago District Regional Attomey who
oversaw the Sidley litigation, has stated that he viewed Clackamas as
"profoundly damaging" to Sidley's case because of the Clackamas Court's
adoption of the EEOC guidelines with their focus on control." According
to Hendrickson, the Clackamas Court's emphasis on control "[was
djamaging because at Sidley ... virtually everything was governed and
controlled by a small executive committee and an even smaller
management committee-both of which were self-perpetuating and not
elected by the partners.""
However, even Judge Posner acknowledged the difficulties in
applying this notion of "control" to a firm as large and complex as Sidley.
He referred to Sidley as a "large law firm-which in recognition that
conventional partnership is designed for much smaller and simpler firms
has contractually altered the structure of the firm in the direction of the
corporate form . . ."7 Judge Easterbrook, in his concurrence in this case,
emphasized this point even more strongly, expressing skepticism regarding
the proposition "that concentration of decision-making authority within an
entity alters the legal status of those who share profits and bear all residual
risks of loss."7 3 Easterbrook thus seemed to view as somewhat overstated
Judge Posner's focus on the relative power of a lawyer in the firm to make
important workplace decisions, and implied that even partners who did not
serve on Sidley's Management and Executive Committees still might be
true "partners" (not employees) for antidiscrimination law purposes.74
67. Id.
68. Id. at 704, 707.
69. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448.
70. John C. Hendrickson, Selected Materials on "Emerging Employment Discrimination Claims,"
782 PLI/LIT 403, 416 (2008).
71. Hendrickson, supra note 70. (emphasis in original).
72. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 707.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 710 (While Judge Easterbrook therefore seemed to view the 32 demoted partners here as
"true partners" for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law, he concurred with the court's opinion in
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2. Criticisms of the Clackamas/Sidleyftamework
Clackamas and Sidley thus made clear that a partner's ability to sue
his/her firm under federal antidiscrimination laws would turn in large part
on the partner's relative power and control within the firm. The decision
caught the attention of both practitioners and academics. Indeed, following
the conclusion of these cases, a host of scholars weighed in regarding
whether the courts had adopted the appropriate test for determining a
partner's ability to sue his or her firm under federal antidiscrimination
law.75 None of these scholars, however, seem to have focused on a broader
implication of these decisions, including the extent to which these decisions
seem to overlook many realities of the modem large law firm.
Without question, modern large law firms operate in a very different
manner than their predecessors operated decades ago. Years ago, firms
operated in an informal and almost familial manner, where partners all
knew each other and made firm-related decisions collaboratively." As
discussed in greater detail below, however, large firms have changed
significantly since those early days, often encompassing hundreds or even
thousands of lawyers, with offices all of the country and even the world. 7
The partners alone in such firms may number in the hundreds, with many
partners having little (if any) regular contact with one another.7
Accordingly, most large firms have abandoned attempts to govern
themselves in a cooperative and decentralized manner, and instead have
adopted complex and centralized management hierarchies. 9 Nothing could
be further from the "small, closely-held businesses" that Justice Powell
referred to in his Hishon concurrence."so
This tremendous growth and expansion among law firms inevitably
hinders individual partners from exercising the type of control and
participation contemplated by the courts in Sidley and Clackamas. In fact,
as much as two decades ago, one federal court recognized the practical
problems with using a partner's "control" within a firm to determine his or
this case due to uncertainty regarding the status of other lawyers in the firm to whom Sidley's
retirement policy would apply.).
75. See Greene and O'Brien, Who Counts?, supra note 17.
76. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 19, 119 (2005); see also Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce,
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543, 570 (2004) ("Law firms once assumed the form of partnerships,
characterized by professional values and a familial spirit.").
77. See infra at § IlA; see also Chambliss, supra note 76, at 119; Johnson, supra note 17, at 1084
(noting that "[i]n response to the globalization of the economy, law firms have expanded, opening
offices across the nation and around the world.") (citations omitted).
78. See Chambliss, supra note 76, at 119 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 127.
80. Johnson, supra note 17, at 1084.
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her ability to sue. In Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, a case examining whether
a general partner in a large accounting firm could sue under various federal
antidiscrimination laws, the 10th Circuit objected to the notion that a "true"
general partnership must "operates like a New England town meeting."$'
Rather, the court observed that within certain partnerships, "'[d]omination'
of a partner in assignment and supervision of work, billing, share of profits,
and other matters can result from a myriad of wholly practical reasons
.82 and noted that "a certain amount of 'domination' may flow from the
necessity of an organizational structure, even in the smallest partnership."83
Challenging the real-world impact of a focus on "actual control" in
determining the status of partners in a firm, the court questioned "[whether]
any partnership of any duration would not have employee partners" under
such a standard.84
The practical problems with this focus on "control" in determining the
status of a partner in a firm only have increased in the two decades since
Wheeler, as firms have continued to grow exponentially." Large firms
simply have become too large and unwieldy to accommodate cooperative
deliberation. In the words of one reporter who covered the Sidley
litigation, "[s]imply stated, it is nearly impossible to manage a half-billion-
dollar business having 200 or more equity partners by giving each of them
a meaningful say before responding to 24-hour opportunities and
challenges."" Even if each office of a national or international firm had its
own committee of individuals who controlled that particular office's
operations, a large number of non-committee member partners within each
office still likely would fail to qualify as "partners" for purposes of federal
antidiscrimination law. In fact, within many firms currently, the
individuals who manage firm operations, and who therefore possess the
greatest amount of power and control, no longer actively practiced law at
all, but rather manage the firm on a full-time basis." Surely, the courts in
81. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 (10th Cir. 1987).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (italics in original). See also Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chicolte, PC, No. 06cvl495,
2009 WL 3602008, 1, 22 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 28, 2009) (observing that "[t]raditionally, partnerships-law
firms are not democracies, and often are dominated by one or a few 'autocratic' partners, but this reality
does not render every other partner in the firm an employee even though he or she retains most of the
indicia of ownership and control").
85. See infra at Part IIA; see also Kirleis, supra note 84, at 22-23.
86. Leigh Jones, Pitfalls of Mandatory Retirement[-] Mandatory Rules Could Spark Suits, NAT'L
L.J. 1, May 23, 2005, at Col. 1.0 (asserting that "in today's huge operations such as DLA Piper
Rudnick Gray Carey or Greenberg Traurig, having hundreds or even thousands of partners participating
in management decisions is impractical ... ) [hereinafter "Pitfalls"].
87. Mary E. Pivec, Retire? Maybe Not Sidley's Age Discrimination Case May Lead to More
Partner Suits, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at 38.
88. See Chambliss, supra note 76, at 130 (citations omitted); see also Quintin Johnstone, An
Overview of the Legal profession in the United States, How that Profession Recently has been
Winter 2010 47
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
cases like Sidley cannot believe that in such firms the only "partners" are
those who no longer practice law."
3. Reactions to the Sidley Suit
As the Sidley litigation continued, large law firms nationwide watched
the case with bated breath. In the words of one partner at the national law
firm Seyfarth Shaw commented, "I think every law firm in the country, if
they're not watching, they should be watching how things unravel and to
see what the court looks to as being important indicia of being a true
partner or really just an employee."O Firms worried that "[t]his case is
going to be used like a can opener by plaintiffs lawyers to pry into law firm
decision making, to go after midsize-to-large law firms." 9' In October,
2007, however, observers lost the opportunity for further guidance from
this case, when Sidley entered into a Consent Decree with the EEOC,
resolving this dispute.92 Among other terms, this Consent Decree provided
that Sidley would pay a sum of $27,500,000 for distribution to eligible
claimants." In addition, Sidley agreed that "[flor purposes of resolution of
this matter . . . each person for whom the EEOC has sought relief in this
matter was an employee for purposes of the ADEA as of the dates when
Sidley made and carried out the decision to remove him or her from the
",94
status of partner .. "9
Even following this settlement, however, many firms remained
concerned about the status if their partners. According to a partner at
another national law firm, Greenberg Traurig, "[t]he fact that EEOC went
after one of the pre-eminent firms in the United States put every other law
firm on notice ... It sends a message to the profession that you have to
look at how you structure yourselves and how you treat partners with
Changing, and its Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 763 (2008) (citation omitted) (noting
the increasing reliance in many firms on non-lawyer firm employees in firm management decisions).
89. Professor Ann McGinley has offered an additional critique of many courts' method of
discerning between "true" partners and employees merely labeled as partners. See McGinley, supra
note 17, at 54-59. Specifically, Professor McGinley argues that most courts place excessive emphasis
on a partner's political power within his/her firm, examining whether the partner has a vote in major
partnership decisions or sits on important firm committees. According to McGinley, however,
"[p]olitical power alone will rarely protect a partner from the possibility of discrimination." Professor
McGinley therefore argues that, in addition to examining a partner's political power to determine
his/her employment status, courts also should evaluate the partner's economic and social power within
the firm. See id. at 55-56.
90. Martha Neil, Who is a Partner? The EEOC Looks Beyond Titles in Its Age Discrimination
Case Against a Law Firm, 91 A.B.A. 1 34 (2005).
91. Id.
92. Consent Decree, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin
LLP, No. 05 cv 0208 (N.D.ll. Oct. 4, 2007).
93. See id. at para. 4(A).
94. Id. at para. 1.
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respect to retirement."" The EEOC likewise has emphasized such
potential liability, with EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson noting
that the agency's litigation against and subsequent settlement with Sidley
"ought to signal that if you are thinking about discriminating on the basis of
age and the governance and control of your firm looks a lot like Sidley's,
you'd better think three times before you do it.""
In fact, the concerns expressed by observers regarding future
discrimination suits by partners amounted to much more than mere
circumspection and paranoia. Following the Clackamas and Sidley
decisions, partners at various other large law firms brought discrimination
claims against their firms." While the specific outcomes in these cases
varied, the courts in all of these cases wholeheartedly seemed to adopt the
type of reasoning that emerged in both Clackamas and Sidley, focusing on
the amount of control that the plaintiffs had exercised within their
respective firms."
Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below,99 the American Bar
Association ("ABA") also took action following Sidley, adopting a
recommendation at its August 2007 meeting which recommended that law
firms discontinue their use of mandatory retirement policies, deeming such
mandatory retirement "not an acceptable practice" and characterizing such
policies as "both unwarranted and unwise." 00  In making this
recommendation, the ABA expressly referred to both Clackamas and
Sidley, citing extensively from the courts' opinions in these cases.'
95. Ameet Sachdev, Age Suit could raise bar; Sidley Austin agrees to pay $27.5 million, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 6, 2007, at Cl.
96. Firing Partners, 07-12 PARTNER's REP. 1 (Dec. 2007).
97. See, e.g., Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chicolte, PC, No. 06-1495, 2007 WL 2142397, 1
(W.D.Pa. July 24, 2007) (deeming plaintiff "employee" for purposes of motion to dismiss in
discrimination and retaliation suit by shareholder her against former lawfirm), aff'd on other grounds,
560 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir. 2009); Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz, Cohn, LLP, 408 F.Supp.2d 374
(E.D. Mich. 2005), aff'd on other grounds, 281 Fed.Appx. 482 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying without
prejudice law firm's motion to dismiss gender and disability discrimination suit brought by former firm
partner); Solon v. Kaplan, No. 00 C 2888, 2004 WL 725893, 1 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 31. 2004), aff'd, 398 F.3d
629 (7th Cir. 2005) (deeming former law firm partner an "employer" in Title VII suit former partners);
see also Martha Neil, Ex-Partner Sues her Law Firm for Bias, 5 No. 36 A.B.A. J. E-Report 4 (Sept. 8,
2006) (describing sex discrimination and retaliation suit filed by former equity partner against law firm
Hinshaw & Culbertson), N.D. Ill. Docket No. 1:06-CV-02958, Entry #15 (Dec. 15, 2006) (indicating
settlement of case); cf. Kirleis , supra note 84 (granting summary judgment to employer upon deeming
lawfirm shareholder an employer, not an employee, for purposes of Title VIl and other employment
laws).
98. Kirleis, 2009 WL 3602008 at 5-26; Panepucci, 408 F.Supp.2d at 377-78; Solon, 398 F.3d at
633-34.
99. See infra notes 165-68.
100. See American Bar Association House of Delegates, DAILY J., Aug. 13-14, 2007, Report 10A
at 11-12, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2007/annual/dailyjournal.doc (last visited Nov.
18 2009) (hereinafter "ABA Recommendation"].
101. Id. at 8-9.
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Focusing specifically on the 7th Circuit's decision in Sidley, the
Recommendation noted that "until recently, the ... mandatory age-based
retirement of law firm partners widely was regarded as lawful and outside
the permissible scope of review by [the EEOC] and the courts,"'02 but that
the Sidley case had "caused the legal profession to sit up and take notice,
and to consider whether established assumptions regarding the
inapplicability of certain civil rights protections to partners ... need to be
reexamined.""o3
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN LARGE LAW FIRM
Clackamas and Sidley caused many law firms-and particularly large
firms-to reevaluate the operation and arrangement of their firms and
question where firm partners fit into this picture. Accordingly, to
understand the impact that these cases might have on large law firms, it is
important to have a clear image of how the modem large law firm operates,
including how these firms have evolved in terms of their structure,
demography, goals and objectives. Each of these aspects of firm operations
potentially may be altered by Clackamas and Sidley.
A. THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN LARGE LAW
FIRM: A CAREFULLY-BALANCED PYRAMID
The common understanding of what constitutes a "large law firm" has
changed substantially over the past few decades. Instead of existing as
small, closely knit partnerships, law firms have ballooned to gigantic
proportions, often encompassing thousands of lawyers all over the world.'04
Concurrent with this expansion in size has been an increasing amount of
hierarchy within firms.' 5  In fact, many law firms have adopted
management structures similar to that eschewed by the court in Sidley,
where layers of committees and managers run the day-to-day aspects of
firm life and where only a handful of the hundreds (or perhaps thousands)
of lawyers in a firm possess the final authority to make important firm
decisions. As one law firm partner discussing this issue observed,
"[r]elegating some decision-making to smaller groups of attorneys is
102. ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at 6.
103. Id. at 7.
104. ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at 7.
105. See supra at Part LC. 1; see also Hendrickson, supra note 70, at 417 (observing that partners in
the modem large law firm "are strung out in enormous office complexes around the world . .," and that
many "may have virtually no voice in their own compensation or destiny, no role in governance, and no
expectation of genuine long-term job security").
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necessary in large firms." 06
Another result of this growth in law firm size has been a focus on
ensuring proper turnover within firms, including within the partnership
ranks. For a number of years, large law firms have followed a model in
which junior lawyers work for some number of years in an effort to obtain
one of a limited number of partnership positions.1 o7 In their seminal book
regarding the structure of large law firms, Professors Marc Galanter and
Thomas Palay call this model the "promotion to partner tournament."' 08
Under this model, senior lawyers (partners) in a firm make an implicit
promise to junior lawyers (associates) that in exchange for the associates'
diligent and competent work over some period of years, the firm will
promote some percentage of these associates to partnership status.'09
Associates who fail to achieve the coveted "partnership" prize depart and
are replaced by a new crop of associates, leading Galanter and Palay to
describe this tournament as an "up or out" model." 0 According to Galanter
and Palay, this tournament structure has spurred a dramatic expansion in
the size of large law firms."' Every promotion of an associate to
partnership status required that the firm not only hire a new junior lawyer
to replace this promoted associate, but also hire additional associates to
labor for this newly-minted new partner,1 2 in order to keep the firm's
associate-to-partner ratio from declining."'
Galanter and Palay's "up or out" model creates various tensions
among the attorneys in a firm. First, the finite number of partnership slots
available to associates induces the associates to compete among themselves
for these positions."' In addition, to the extent that this model requires that
106. Leigh Jones, Pitfalls, supra note 86.
107. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 26-32, 99-102 (1991); see also
David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1582-83
(1998) (citing Galanter & Palay).
108. Galanter & Palay, supra note 107, at 100 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 26-32; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1582 (citing Galanter & Palay);
Johnson, supra note 17, at 1079-80 (citing Galanter & Palay).
110. Galanter & Palay, supra note 107, at 28-29; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic
Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1873 (2008);
Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Coming ofAge in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of
Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 571 (1989).
111. Galanter & Palay, supra note 107, at 102-08; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107 (citing
Galanter & Palay).
112. Galanter & Palay, supra note 107, at 107; see also Galanter & Henderson, supra note 110, at
1883.
113. Galanter & Palay, supra note 107, at 107; see also infra note 143 (discussing significance of
firms' "leverage"-the ratio of associates to partners).
114. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1603 (citing Galanter & Palay, supra note 107). Wilkins
and Gulati point out, however, that not all associates in a firm are competing for a partnership slot.
Rather, many associates join a firm with no intention of remaining at the firm long enough to make
partner. Id. at 1606-07 (citations omitted). Moreover, despite the "competition" among associates for
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some number of partners regularly depart from the firm to "make room" for
this new crop incoming partners, the model potentially creates tensions
among partners."' Galanter separately wrote about this phenomenon a
decade ago, noting that firms must promote their most productive
associates to partnership in order to ensure that the "tournament" of
associates continues to operate,"l6 but that an increase in the size of the
partnership potentially decreases the income of all partners, since a larger
pool of individuals would share in the firm's profits."' Galanter observed
that to maintain the overall income of partners, firms often attempt to push
out those who already are partners,"' and observed that "[u]nlike the old
country doctor or lawyer who died in harness, a career in corporate law is
beginning to resemble one in investment banking, where careers phase out
by one's late forties.""'
Thus, until recently, the structure of most large law firms resembled
that of a steadily growing pyramid, with a limited number of partners
residing at the narrow "top" of the pyramid and an increasing number of
associates making up the wider "base" of the pyramid. The integrity of this
structure not only has depended on the steady influx of new associates, but
also upon some consistent departure by partners from the top of the
pyramid to make room for associates who ascend to the partnership.
Recent changes within the legal community, however-and particularly
within large law firms-have jeopardized this carefully-balanced structure.
B. RECENT CHANGES WITHIN THE STRUCTURE AND CULTURE OF LARGE
FIRMS
For many years, this pyramid structure that characterized the modem
partnership slots, Wilkins and Gulati observe that associates tend to work collaboratively in teams.
Id..at 1613-16.
115. Elizabeth Goldberg, The "Old Geezer" Factor Not an Issue at some Law Firms, THE
RECORDER (SAN FRANCISCO), Sept. 4, 2007, at 3 (observing that firms "want to create room in
leadership ranks for bright young stars to grow .....").
116. Marc Galanter, Address, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of
the Legal Profession and its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 108 1,
I 100 (1999). [hereinafter Old and in the Way].
117. Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116.
118. Id. at 1100-01.
119. Id. at 1101; cf Wilkins and Gulati, supra note 107, at 1660 (observing that "[1]aw firms are
unwilling to make new partners unless the existing level of demand for the new lawyer's services
satisfies some absolute standard."). The terms of a firm's partnership agreement generally will
facilitate this result by specifying how a partner can be expelled from the firm: Some partnership
agreements might require a majority vote by some or all partners in the firm before a partner can be
expelled, while other partnership agreements might delegate the power to terminate, demote, or take
other actions against partners to a special executive or managerial committee within the firm. See 59A
AM. JUR. 2D PARTNERSHIP § 330. In addition, firms can mandate the departure of partners by including
within the partnership agreement a clause that requires partners to retire at a specified age. See supra
Part III.A.I.
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large law firm enabled firms to expand both their number of lawyers and
their bottom lines. Two recent phenomena, however, have threatened the
equilibrium within these large firms: (i) the increase in older lawyers
continuing to work; and (ii) the enhanced emphasis on "profits per partner"
as a measure of law firm success.
1. Recent trend of older lawyers continuing to work
One significant change that has taken place within the legal profession
as a whole, including within large law firms, is the dramatic increase in
older lawyers who have continued to work well past the time when
previous generations of lawyers had retired. The average age of lawyers in
the United States has increased significantly in recent years. In the mid-
1980s, there were almost three times as many "younger" lawyers as "older"
lawyers composing the American legal community:12 For every 100
lawyers in their thirties practicing law in the United States, there were just
35 lawyers in their fifties.'21 By 1995, however, there were 50 "older"
lawyers for every 100 "younger" lawyers,122 and Professor Galanter
projects that absent an unanticipated increase in younger lawyers, there will
be 97 "older" lawyers for every 100 "younger" lawyers by the year 2020.123
In many respects, this aging of the American legal community simply
reflects an aging of the American workforce more generally. Americans in
a variety of professions seem to be stretching their professional lives into
what once would have been deemed their golden retirement years. Recent
data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau shows that the percentage of
working individuals age 62 and older increased significantly between 1990
and 2007,124 and this trend seems likely to continue as dour economic
circumstances delay many older individuals' retirements.' 25
Several factors might explain this increase in the number of older
workers generally, and in the number older lawyers in particular. For one
thing, significant advances in medicine have allowed older individuals to
remain healthier in their later years, thus increasing the length of their
120. Galanter, Old and In the Way, supra note 116, at 1085.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1102. (observing that the the American legal community also appears particularly "grey"
in comparison to lawyers abroad, and noting thateven a decade ago, the number of older lawyers in
America roughly equaled the entire legal profession throughout all of the European Union.).
123. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 115, at 3 (noting that "[l]awyers are living longer and
healthier, and many want to stay professionally active well into their seventies").
124. Patrick Purcell, CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report for Congress, Older Workers:
Employment and Retirement Trends, Sept. 7, 2007, at CRS-5 (on file with author); see also Anna
Quindlen, Stepping Aside, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 2009, at 70 (observing that "[t]he baby boom
generation . . . take[s] up more room than any other generation in American history. They now account
for about a quarter of the population. And so, inevitably, they have created a kind of bottleneck, in the
workworld, in politics, in power").
125. See infra notes 128-129.
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career paths.12 6  Economic necessity also undoubtedly plays a role in this
phenomenon, as many workers discover that their pensions and/or personal
savings are insufficient to support them in retirement.'27 Such financial
considerations recently have moved to the forefront of workers' retirement
considerations, as a downturn in the American economy has affected
numerous older workers' retirement portfolios to a significant degree.'28
Finally, changing norms within society regarding aging and retirement also
have led to this increase in older lawyers. Many lawyers simply are not
ready to give up satisfying and prolific careers solely because they have
reached a particular age.129
2. Recent increased emphasis on "profits per partner" as a key indicator
offirm success
In addition to this increase in the average age among lawyers, large
firm practice also has been transformed by a second phenomenon: the
increased focus on "profits per partner" as a key indicator of law firm
126. JOHN T. BERRY ET AL., JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGING LAWYERS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
BAR COUNSEL (NOBC) & ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (APRL), NOBC-APRL
JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGING LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT (2007), available at
http://www.aprl.net/pdf/NOBC-APRL.pdf, at 3. (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter "NOBC-APRL
REPORT"]; see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Esther F. Lardent, Reena N. Glazer & Kellen
Ressmeyer, "Old and Making Hay ": The Results of the Pro Bono Institute Firm Survey on the Viability
of a "Second Acts'" Program to Transition Attorneys to Retirement Through Pro Bono Work, 7
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 321, 327 (2009) ("As people live longer and come to enjoy
productive years beyond the typical work life, they are quite naturally looking for new ways to find
personal fulfillment and meaning in the second half of their life").
127. Katherine Bridges and David Cicero, American Association for Retired Persons (AARP),
American Association of Retired Persons, Preparing for an Aging Workforce: A Focus on New York
Businesses, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/ny-worker_- 07.pdf, at 2 (2007) (last visited
Nov. 18 2009); see also NOBC-APRL REPORT, supra note 126, at 3; John W. Schoen, The new
'retirement' plan: Just Keep Working, MSNBC.com, July 28, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/32086450/ns/business-personal-finance (last visited Aug. 18 2009).
128. Quindlen, supra note 124, at 70 (noting that many baby boomers "would love to retire but no
longer can afford to do so"); cf Karen Sloan, Depression Among Attorneys Rises as Economy Sinks,
THE NAT'L L. J., May 5, 2009 (describing increasing depression among older attorneys who "are
feeling so desponded because they were close to retiring, and now retirement is gone and their practices
are struggling. . . .").
129. NOBC-APRL REPORT, supra note 126, at 3 (citing the "strong desire among many senior
lawyers to continue making positive contributions to society"). Ironically, many argue that individuals
achieve their most productive levels in their "older" years. See Linda Morton, Janet Weinstein & Mark
Weinstein, Not Quite Grown Up: The Difficulty of Applying an Adult Education Model to Legal
Externs, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 469, 523-24 (1999) (charting life cycle phases and noting that individuals
tend to "cap career" between ages 45-55); see also Madge S. Thorsen, Boomer-ESQ s: Another Wrinkle
on How to Practice Law?, 53 PRAC. LAW. 33 ("Unlike athletes or movie stars, but like fine red wines,
lawyers almost always improve with age. Past 50 years is the legal profession's 'prime time' and
arguably the most productive years of a lawyer's professional life"); Julie Cresswell, Law Firms are
Urged Not to Force Retirements, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at C6 (quoting 67-year-old lawyer's
concern that "mandatory retirement ages are getting younger just as people are getting older and leading
more productive lives"). Many thanks to Professor Janet Weinstein for raising this point.
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success." 0 Attributed to Steven Brill, the founder of The American Lawyer
magazine, "profits per partner" measures net operating income, minus
compensation for non-equity partners, divided by the number of equity
partners."' This measure often involves astronomical numbers: According
to The American Lawyer's rankings for 2008, the nation's top-ten earners
in terms of profits per partner earned between $2,290,000 per partner and
$4,010,000 per partner.13 2 Ironically, such numbers represented a "down"
year in terms of profits per partner.'33
This emphasis on profits per partner pervades the legal market.
Rather than using a finn's success in litigation or its workplace morale as a
means of measuring law firm success, many of the observers that "matter"
-law students, other lawyers, and law firm ranking sources-all seem to
have shifted their focus to profits per partner as a means of gauging a
firm's reputation and prestige. Indeed, profits per partner rankings "have
become the industry's measuring stick . . .,n134 not only functioning as a
way of making comparisons among firms, but also serving as a marketing
tool for firms to use in recruiting new legal talent, since "maintaining a
higher per-partner profit . . . creates a competitive edge to help attract top
lateral hires."'13  Steven Brill, for example, defended his magazine's
publication of these rankings by asserting that "[p]eople who were deciding
careers, and looking at law firms as business institutions ought to have
some means of comparison."'3 6  Likewise, the chairman of the major law
130. Ameet Sachdev, Profit motive honing law firms; More partners asked to leave ifthey fail to meet
revenue goals, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2006, at Cl (observing that joining the ranks of the top 25-30 law
firms in the United States turns on "two widely watched financial benchmarks: revenue per lawyer and
profits per equity partner"); cf Stewart Weltman, The Faustian Deal and Why We Litigators Must
Change the Way We Practice, Lean and Mean Litigation Blog, May 26, 2008, available at
http://leanlitigation.typepad.com/weltman/2008/05/the-faustian-de.htm (last visited Aug. 18 2009)
(observing that "[flirms are now completely driven by the bottom line. It controls all that is done.").
131. Andrew Zangrilli, FindLaw for Legal professionals, Junior Associates-The State of the Legal
Profession, Part 2, http://practice.findlaw.com/law-practice-management-articles/00 0 0 6/0 0 0455.html
(last visited Aug. 18 2009).
132. The AmLaw 100[:] 2009 Five Firms Drop Below $1 Million, AM. LAW 169 (2009).
133. Posting of Elie Mystal, elie@abovethelaw.com, to http://abovethelaw.com/2009/04/the
amlaw_1OO.php (last visited Aug. 18 2009) (noting that "overall, the AmLaw 100 confirms what most
observers feared. Amy Winehouse had a better 2008 than most American lawyers"); see also The
AmLaw 100[J. The Party's Over, AM. LAW 109 ("For most ofthe past five years, Am Law 100 firms
flourished. That came to a crashing halt in 2008.").
134. Bloomberg News, Jenner law firm demoting 15-20 partners, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2007, at C2;
see also Zangrilli, supra note 132, (observing that profits per partner "has become the benchmark by
which law firms judge themselves.").
135. Danielle M. Evans, Non-Equity Partnership: A Flawed Solution to the Disproportionate
Advancement of Women in Private Law Firms, 28 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 93, 95 (2007) (citation
omitted); see also Weltman, supra note 130, (citing the need "to maintain or raise 'profits per partner'
in order to keep and lure supposed rainmakers"); Ameet Sachdev, Mayer move a legal stunner; Cutting
partners unusualfor firm, but not for others, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2007, at CNl.
136. Sachdev, Mayer move a legal stunner. . ., supra note 135; (quoting observation by managing
partner of large law firm Winston & Strawn that "[revenue per lawyer] is the equivalent of earnings per
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firm Mayer Brown Rowe and Maw defended the layoff of equity partners
within his firm as part of an "objective[] to make sure our stock price stays
high."'3
In addition to firms marketing themselves to outsiders based upon
their profits per partner, this figure serves an important internal mechanism
as well, functioning as a means for retaining talent within the firm. Unlike
previous generations of lawyers, who tended to remain within a single firm
for their entire careers, lawyers today tend to move more freely between
firms, often jumping among multiple firms over the course of their
careers.'38  Thus, competition among firms for the most successful
attorneys-those with significant clients or with the largest books of
business-can be fierce, and firms frequently use profits per partner to woo
partners away from a competitor.' Conversely, a reduction in profits per
partner can prompt the departure of key lawyers from a firm.'40 Such an
exit of key partners, if occurring on a large scale, can threaten the very
existence of the firm.' 4 ' Firms therefore have come to view this measure of
profits per partner as an essential aspect of their survival.'4 2
3. Tensions Created by the Intersection of These Two Developments
These two developments within the legal profession - the increasing
length of lawyers' careers and the increased emphasis on profits per partner
- inevitably will create tensions within many firms, what has been called an
share in the corporate world.").
137. Sachdev, supra note 136..
138. Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116, at 1094 (citation omitted) (describing changes
within large law firms in recent years, including "attorney movement from firm to firm" and the
"increased mobility of individual lawyers"); see also Changing Times: Free-Agent Partners Find
Receptive Market, CRAIN'S CLEV. Bus, 1998 WLNR 1411393 (1998) (observing that "[i]n the legal
world, partners are hopping from one law firm to another with growing frequency").
139. Robert Ankeny, Staffing becomes target as firms hunt for profits, 23 CRAIN'S DET. Bus. 13,
2007 WLNR 24613218 (2007) (quoting legal recruiter's observation that "big firms want to make
profits-per-partner look better as they recruit for opening new offices"); Ameet Sachdev, Jenner &
Block law firm cuts several partners, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2008, at Cl (describing the inceased pressure
on partners in large firms to bill more hours and bring in new business and observing that "[h]igher
profits can help attract other rainmakers"); see also Gina Passarella, With an Eye of Profits, Firms Tier
Up, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 1 (2006) ("When looking at a firm's financial prestige, profits per
equity partner seems to reign supreme despite grumblings over its alleged manipulation").
140. See Sachdev, Jenner & Block law firm cuts several partners, supra note 139 ("Firms that don't
keep up risk losing their most profitable lawyers"); Galanter & Henderson, supra note 110, at 1891 ("In
a competitive marketplace in which rainmaking partners have abundant opportunities at crosstown
rivals, expanding the partnership runs the risk of diluting profits and prompting the exit of key
lawyers").
141. Id.
142. Martha Neil, Brave New World of Partnership, 90 A.B.A. J. 31, 34 (2004). Ironically, this
focus on profits per partner has persisted despite skepticism regarding the accuracy of this measurement
and significant concerns about firms' ability to manipulate this figure. [hereinafter "Brave"] See
Passarella, supra note 139.
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"increasing tension between profits and size."l 43 The profits "pie" that firm
partners divide among themselves only can grow so large, and so the more
partners who claim a piece of this pie, the lower the calculation of a firm's
profits per partner. In this way, law firms differ from other national or
international businesses that likewise may be facing an increase in older
employees.'" While a corporation or other large "non-partnership"
business must remain attuned to its bottom line (particularly if it is a
publicly traded company accountable to shareholders), non-partnerships
will not necessarily see profits decrease as the company grows. Indeed, the
company may see profits rise as the workforce expands, if this increase in
manpower helps the company to become more productive. An increase in
older lawyers within a partnership, however, will decrease all partners'
share in such gains, unless accompanied by a corresponding spike in firm
profits. Firms therefore have recognized that remaining competitive (at
least in terms of the financial benchmarks that matter) might require rather
drastic measures.
One step adopted by many firms to enhance their perceived prosperity
has been to trim the size of their partnerships.'45 By decreasing the number
of partners who share in the firm's profits, a firm can increase its profits per
partner. This decision to decrease the firm's partners, however, frequently
has hit older partners the hardest. While partnership used to be viewed as
akin to a tenured position, much of the job security associated with this
lofty status has given way to increasing uncertainty and unrest. In the
words of EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson, "as the legal
profession has become more like a business, the younger people who are
coming up are more anxious to get a bigger piece of the pie and the way to
do that is to get rid of the elders." 4 6 Professor Galanter has echoed this
view, observing that "[a]s firms accumulate ever-larger cadres of partners,
there is an increasing pressure on lawyers over fifty, apart from rainmakers
and a few specialists and superstars, to make way for younger partners and
eventually to leave."' 47 This observation further resonates with law firm
143. Sachdev, Profit motive honing law firms..., supra note 130 (quoting founder of legal
consulting firm); see also Niraj Chockshi & Zusha Elinson, Floating on a Turbulent Economy Being
Spread Out Helped Firms Weather a Rough Year, 132 RECORDER (SAN FRANCISCO), Jan. 10, 2008, at
I (noting that even in year when large firm Littler Mendelson saw increase in gross revenue of 28%, it
saw decrease in revenues per lawyer and profits per partner as its headcount grew by half); Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 110, at 584 (observing that "firm leverage [i.e., the ratio of associates to partners]
is directly related to form profit: the higher the firm's leverage, the higher the firm's per partner
profit.") (footnote omitted).
144. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
145. See Ankeny, supra note 139 (observing firms tendency to "thin partner ranks to boost profits");
see also Sachdev, Profit motive honing law firms. . ., supra note 130.
146. Julie Cresswell & Karen Donovan, Happy Birthday, Vacate Your Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2006, at Cl; see also Neil, Brave, supra note 142, at 72 (observing that "[t]he tendency in a competitive
business environment is to emphasize law practice as a business.").
147. See Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116, at 1094; see also Julie Cresswell, Law
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partners themselves. As one large law firm partner observed, "To be a
healthy institution, you have to encourage people to hand off business to
the younger generation."1 4 8
As attention to a firm's profits per partner has increased in recent
years, numerous large law firms have tried to "push out" older lawyers.149
In the late 1990s, for example, the Wall Street firm Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft attracted significant attention when a group of younger
partners in the firm initiated a "putsch" to rid the firm of less productive
older partners, ultimately increasing the firm's profits per partner by 22%
in one year.' Referring to the move as "Project Rightsize," these younger
Cadwalader partners defended their actions, with one partner noting that
the decision "wasn't about greed. . . . [It] was about doing the greatest
good for the greatest number of people."'' A lawyer who represents law
firms in labor and employment matters provided a similar assessment of
this type of conduct, noting that "[t]he younger people want to make more
money.... The senior people have been making money for a long time,
and for the young people to make more, the old people need to go. It is just
as mercenary as it sounds."' 52
In the decade since the Cadwalader putsch, such conduct has become
more commonplace among large firms. In June 2007, the large Chicago-
based law firm Jenner & Block de-equitized between 15 and 20 of its
equity partners.'15  The preceding March, Mayer Brown, Rowe & Mawe-
a firm whose genteel and low pressure culture previously had earned it the
moniker "Mother Mayer" -eliminated 45 partners. 5 4 Indeed, firms across
the country have followed this model, trimming partnership ranks in an
Firms are Urged Not to Force Retirements, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at C6 ("Law firms that have
adopted more corporate like structures have long argued that older partners needed to be moved out to
give more opportunities and a bigger chunk of profits to younger lawyers"); see also Leigh Jones,
Pitfalls., supra note 86 (observing that requiring older lawyers to retire upon reaching a certain age
"facilitates a routine exodus of older partners, allowing the careers of younger partners to flourish as
they take on the work of the old guard.").
148. Cresswell & Donovan, supra note 146; see also Nathan Koppel, The law of profits; Lawyers
are finding out partnership no longer has its privileges, as many elite firms are trying to stay profitable
by firing and demoting their partners, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 27, 2007, at 6 (quoting observation by
partner in large Dallas law firm that "'Partnership no longer is a tenured position .. .You have to get up
every Monday morning and prove yourself all over again.").
149. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1616 (citation omitted) ("It is a reality of today's
competitive market that if new partners find that they are generating the lion's share of the partnership's
profits, they may well decide to terminate some of their older, less productive colleagues.").
150. See Paul M. Barrett, Putsch and Shove: A Once-Stodgy Firm makes a Flashy Return, But at
What Cost?, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at Al.
15 1. Id.
152. Goldberg, supra note 115, at 3.
153. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, supra note 135 (describing de-equitization of 15-20 equity partners
as "a means to boost the average profits earned by equity partners to retain rainmakers and lure new
talent.").
154. Sachdev, Mayer move a legal stunner. . ., supra note 135; see also Koppel, supra note 148.
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effort to increase profitability." Sidley likewise allowed concerns about
profitability to motivate the demotions that lead to the EEOC's suit.' 6
According to EEOC attorney Hendrickson, "the highest ranking members
of [Sidley] were repeatedly quoted about the changes being made to benefit
younger members of the firm . . . ."' Recent economic conditions only
have exacerbated this problem. Faced with increasing pressure to create a
strong financial image despite otherwise-dwindling profits per partner, 58
many law firms have "'us[ed] this [downturn] as an opportunity to let go
people who maybe were at the tail end of their careers."'l
Thus, this growth in the size of the partnership pyramid- particularly
due to the increase in older partners-frequently has run up against firms'
bottom-line focus on profits per partner. While many firms' response to
this conflict has involved pushing out older partners, cases like Clackamas
and Sidley have demonstrated the legal risks inherent in that strategy.
IV. A CRUMBLING PYRAMID: CLACKAMAS AND SIDLEY
ACCELERATE THE DECLINE OF THIS STRUCTURE
Without question, the courts' decisions in both Clackamas and Sidley
garnered significant attention among legal scholars and practitioners.
Much of the scholarship regarding these decisions, however, seems to have
focused on whether the courts adopted the appropriate test for determining
who qualifies as an employee for purposes of antidiscrimination law, and
on the extent to which the decisions might limit employers' ability to take
certain actions against the partners or shareholders in a business.6 o Few (if
any) scholars have discussed the broader issue of how these decisions
might affect the structure and inner workings of law firms, including large
law firms in particular. This Section considers Clackamas and Sidley from
that perspective. This Section first discusses the extent to which these
155. See Koppel, supra note 148 (noting that midsize Atlanta firm Powell Goldstein recently had
demoted or fired partners); see also Bloomberg News, supra note 135; Sachdev, Jenner & Block law
firm cuts several partners, supra note 139 (noting that Jenner's cutbacks followed similar reductions at
Mayer Brown, Winston & Strawn, and Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal).
156. See Wilkins, Partner, Schmartner!, supra note 17, at 1265 (describing decline in Sidley's
revenues preceding the demotions and noting that demotions of underperforming partners "would
immediately improve the firm's profits per partner"); cf Hendrickson, supra note 70, at 416 (describing
older partner overhearing reference to demoted partners as "deadwood").
157. Hendrickson, supra note 70, at 416 (emphasis in original).
158. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (citing recent figures in The American Lawyer
showing a decrease in profits per partner for 2008).
159. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms Use Downturn as Opportunity to Ax Older partners,
Recruiter Says, ABA J., May 1, 2009 (quoting legal recruiter regarding impact of layoffs on older law
firm partners),
160. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Winter 2010 59
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
cases limit firms' ability to mandate the retirement of older partners. It
then focuses on some potential ramifications of limiting firms' conduct in
this way, speculating as to what steps firms may take to try to remain
profitable while still maintaining a large pool of partners.
A. THE IMPACT OF CLACKAMAS AND SIDLEY
1. Death Knell for Mandatory Retirement Policies
Even prior to the decisions in Clackamas and Sidley, firms were
grappling with how they could balance this increasing emphasis on profits
per partner against the reality of partnerships that were ballooning in size.
In response to this tension, many large firms sought to trim their
partnership ranks, particularly by using mandatory retirement policies.
Indeed, mandatory retirement policies quickly became a regular feature
within large firms: a survey released in May 2005 by Altman Weil, a law
firm consultancy, reported that 38% of the 202 law firms responding to the
study used some form of mandatory retirement, and that of that group, 57%
of firms with 100 or more attorneys had mandatory retirement policies.'"'
Firms apparently saw such mandatory retirement policies as a
relatively simple means to balance their competing concerns regarding
promotion to partner and continued profitability. These policies help to
keep profits per partner at a high level by limiting the number of partners
who receive a share of the profits. In addition, mandatory retirement
policies facilitate the transition of work from older to younger partners. As
the managing partner of one large law firm observed, "'[i]t's in the
business interests of the firm to see work transitioned to other partners at
age 70."'l62 Moreover, mandatory retirement policies provide consistency
within a firm, alleviating the need for a case-by-case analysis of older
partners' abilities.'
In the wake of Clackamas and Sidley, however, it seems clear that
utilizing a mandatory retirement policy creates significant potential
exposure for a firm under the ADEA. If any partner who was required to
retire under such a policy was deemed an employee for purposes of the
ADEA, then he or she undoubtedly would have a viable claim of age
discrimination. Thus, some within the legal community have begun to
speak out against the continued use of these policies. For example, Marc
Alcott, the past president of the New York State Bar Association
161. See Leigh Jones, Pitfalls, supra note 86.
162. Id.
163. Id.; but see infra Part. IV.A. I (discussing the benefits of conducting an individualized analysis
of older partners' abilities to continue working for their firms).
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"NYSBA" and an outspoken critic of law firm mandatory retirement
policies, has observed that that the Sidley settlement "suggests the
approaching death of age-based retirement policies among the nation's
largest firms."l64 The American Bar Association likewise has come out
squarely against the continued use of mandatory retirement policies,
adopting a Recommendation at its August 2007 meeting that law firms
cease their use of such policies.16' After studying both the legal and factual
background regarding firms' use of mandatory retirement policies, the
ABA concluded that "mandatory retirement-requiring a partner to leave
the firm upon reaching an arbitrary age-is not an acceptable practice," 6 6
deeming mandatory retirement policies "unwarranted and unwise," 67 and
citing concerns that mandatory retirement policies violate federal age
discrimination laws. 68
Cases like Clackamas and Sidley therefore have added an additional
dimension to the dilemma faced by large law firms that feel trapped by the
increasing size of their partnerships and by the need to maximize their
profits per partner. While firms previously might have tried to push out
older partners in the firm in an effort to maintain flush profits-per-partner,
these two cases make it clear that firms which utilize mandatory retirement
policies open themselves up to significant exposure under the ADEA.
This restriction on mandatory retirement is not necessarily bad. There
are many reasons to limit the use of mandatory retirement within the legal
profession. Older partners bring to their work a wealth of experience and
insight from which their younger colleagues can benefit.'16  In addition,
from a normative perspective, we should not permit any business (and
particularly not law firms) to discriminate on the basis of age merely by
relying upon a technical definition (i.e., "employee") under federal law. As
the ABA observed in its Recommendation, "[slociety has made a judgment
in every other field that people should not be put out to pasture arbitrarily,
solely because of age. The legal profession should not be fighting a rear
164. Terminating Partners: What will the Sidley Settlement Mean for law Firm Owners?, 07-12
PARTNER'S REPORT 1 (Dec. 2007).
165. Anna Stem, Heeding the Call for the End of Mandatory Retirement, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1095, 1095 (2008) (citations omitted).
166. ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at I1.
167. Id. at 11-12 ("A lawyer's age, standing alone, is not an appropriate criterion for determining
professional capacity or employment status.").
168. See Stern, supra note 165, at 1101-02 (citations omitted). Even before the ABA issued its
Recommendation, the NYSBA had adopted a similar opposition to mandatory retirement policies,
issuing a report recommending that firms cease utilizing these types of policies and proposing that the
ABA adopt this position as well. Id. at 1098-1100. The bar associations in several other states
subsequently expressed varying degrees of support for the NYSBA's position. Id. at 1100-01.
169. See Thorsen, supra note 129, at 34 (noting that "clients with serious legal concerns want
serious and seasoned advice from masters who have been around the block.").
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guard action against this public policy. . ..
Yet this protection of older partners, particularly by imposing
limitations on mandatory retirement, may have significant consequences
for law firms and for the lawyers who work there. With a greater number
of partners remaining at work in the firm, and a continued emphasis on
profits per partner as a measure of success, firms may take any number of
alternative steps to try to remain profitable while complying with the
ADEA. As discussed in greater detail below, many of these steps present
their own set of serious drawbacks for any number of interested parties.
2. Something's Gotta Give: Law Firms' Potential Responses to this
Increase in Older Partners
The calculation faced by the modem large law firm is simple: In order
to maximize profits per partner, firms either must increase the amount of
profits to be divided among partners or must decrease the number of
partners who claim a share of this "pie." Accordingly, to the extent that
decisions like Clackamas and Sidley rule out one approach for limiting the
number of partners in a firm-the utilization of mandatory retirement
policies-firms will have to use other methods for achieving one or both of
these results. Unfortunately, many of the methods may have significant
negative ramifications not only for other lawyers in the firm, but also for
the legal profession and for society as a whole.
a. Increased billing pressure on associates and partners
One approach that law firms might adopt to ensure stable profits in the
face of an increasing partnership is to increase the amount of revenue that
individual lawyers bring in. While firms arguably could accomplish this
goal by increasing the rates that they charge to clients,' 7 ' market
competition limits the extent to which firms can increase their rates.'72
Indeed, given the recent economic downturn, clients seem more likely than
ever to resist the ever-skyrocketing hourly rates charged by firms."'
170. See ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at 11.
171. Galanter, Old and in the Way., supra note 116, at 1100.
172. Id.; see also Nathan Koppel & Ashby Jones, 'Billable Hour' Under Attack, THE WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 2009, at Al ("Companies have long complained that legal fees are inflated by a business
model in which law firms have high-priced junior lawyers who must be kept busy billing for work that
could be handled more efficiently").
173. See Jim Hassett, Why Every Lawyer Should Consider a New Billing Approach in 2009, 28 No.
3 OF COUNSEL 5, 5 (2009) (discussing desire by companies to protect bottom line in current economic
downturn and asserting that "[flor law firms, that means more pressure from clients for alternative
fees"); Sherry L. Talton, Economy Renews Billable Hour Debate, A.B.A LITIG. NEWS, July 1, 2009,
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top-stories/billable-hour-alternative-
fee.html. ("The economic recession has renewed the debate about the billable hour as more litigation
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Thus, to increase the revenue generated by lawyers, firms might
pressure attorneys to increase their billable hours.'74 To some extent, this
pressure already exists; average billable hours have been on the rise for
some time. Firms' billable hour expectations increased from
approximately 1,500 billable hours per year in the 1960s, to between 1,600
and 1,800 billable hours per year in the 1970s and 1980s, to 1,961 billable
hours per year in the 1990s, with associates often billing in excess of this
expectation.15 More recently, a 2005 study conducted by Professor Susan
Saab Forney and funded by the NALP Foundation found that the mean
hours billed by associates at very large firms (defined as firms with over
300 attorneys) had reached 2,059 in 2004.176
This pressure to bill an ever-increasing number of hours has severe
consequences for law firm associates. Many scholars and practitioners
already have written about the detrimental impact that this emphasis on the
billable hour has had on associates' quality of life.' Associates
themselves readily recognize this affect, with one of Professor Forney's
respondents commenting that his or her "major life struggle comes from
billable hours."' 78  Billable hours also devalue associates' work,
"quantifying" associates' contributions to the firm using this objective
measure over a more qualitative analysis. 179
Finally-and perhaps of greatest societal concern-this increased
emphasis on billable hours also raises potential ethical concerns for
associates by "increas[ing] the potential for conflicts of interest between
the associate's need to meet the firm's expectations and the client's interest
in fair billing."'
Just as associates suffer from an increase in billable hour expectations,
law firm partners likewise experience many of these negative effects. As
previously noted, partners no longer enjoy the presumption of lifetime job
clients look for ways to reduce legal expenses"); Koppel & Jones, supra note 172 (citing survey that
found an increase of more than 50% this year in clients' use of alternative billing arrangements).
174. See Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116, at 1100.
175. Neil Hamilton, A look at the effects of increasing the hours that associates must bill, MtNN.
LAW., Jun. 4, 2001 (describing study conducted by Prof. Susan Saab Fortney and the Texas Bar
Association's department of research); see also Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby:
Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005).
176. Fortney, supra note 175, at 176.
177. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 175, at 179 (noting that for many survey respondents "billable
hours pressure and long hours were at the heart of work-life conflicts"); Hamilton, supra note 175
(observing that "[i]ncreasing billable hour expectations creates conflict . . . with the quality of work life
itself and with the balance between work life and personal/family life").
178. Fortney, supra note 175, at 179-80 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
180. Hamilton, supra note 17 see also Fortney, supra note 175, at 178, 187 (citations omitted)
(discussing concern that billable our requirements encourage lawyers to "pad" their time).
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security."' Instead of simply focusing on "making partner" in the early
part of their careers, partners now additionally must focus upon "staying
partner."' 82 Accordingly, they too must respond to firm expectations,
including increasing pressure "to bring in business as well as to contribute
to firm revenues by billing long hours."' 83  This increased emphasis on
billable hours not only might cause partners to experience the same quality
of life consequences and ethical concerns discussed above with respect to
associates, but also might discourage partners from making other "non-
billable" contributions to the firm, including the training of associates
(discussed further below).
b. Establishment of obstacles to making partner
An additional approach that law firms might take in response to this
limit on mandatory retirement might be to make it harder for associates to
achieve partnership status. If firms cannot limit the size of partnership pool
by requiring older partners to leave the firm, they might accomplish this
same task by reducing the number of entering partners.
In recent years, it already has become more difficult for associates to
make partner, as a "'whole constellation of factors' weigh against an
associate's chances of ever making partner.' 84 As the number of students
graduating law school has increased in recent years, leading to a rise in the
number of incoming associates in firms, many firms have lengthened their
partnership tracks and otherwise have made the partnership prize more
difficult to attain.'18  For example, firms have created various levels of
achievement prior to equity partnership status, such as "of counsel,"
"permanent associate," "special counsel" or "non-equity partner."' Firms
also deliberate carefully before making new partners, not only examining
the credentials and qualifications of associate-candidates, but also
questioning whether the firm's volume of business in the associate's field
can support the addition of another partner in that area.'87
181. See supra Part. 11.B.3; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1615.
182. See Koppel, supra note 148.
183. Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116, at 1095; see also Sachdev, supra note 139
(observing that "despite years of rising revenue and profit there is unyielding pressure on partners to bill
more hours and bring in new business.").
184. See Neil, Brave, supra note 142, at 33.
185. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 1081 (citation omitted).
186. Id.at 1082; see also infra at Part. Ill.A.2.c (discussing use of two-tiered equity/non-equity
partnership structure).
187. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1661.
("Law firms are unwilling to make new partners unless the existing level of demand for
the new lawyer's services satisfies some absolute standard. . .. This absolute standard, the
amount of demand for new partners in a given area, defines the terms of the competition in
which senior associates compete to win partnership slots.").
Vol. 6.164
A CRUMBLING PYRAMID
If firms continue to face pressure to limit the number of partners who
share in firm profits, yet are constrained from cutting older partners from
the firm, the obstacles for associates seeking partnership are likely to
multiply. Firms might lengthen the path to the partnership prize, funneling
associates through an increasing number of preliminary levels before they
can share in the equity of the firm. They may look even more carefully at
the "business case" for elevating an associate to the partnership, requiring
even greater evidence that the firm's revenue supports adding an additional
partner in a given practice area. Stepping up these requirements not only
will limit the number of new partners who must share in the firm's profits,
but also would ensure that only those associates who are the most
dedicated, hard-working and (presumably) high-billing, and who thus are
likely to generate the greatest amount of revenue for the firm, achieve the
status of partner in a firm.
c. Increased use of two-tiered equity/non-equity partnership structure
Just as firms might try to make up for their inability to get rid of older
partners in the firm by increasing the length of their partnership tracks or
creating other obstacles to attaining partnership status, firms also might try
to limit those who share in the partnership's profits by creating additional
partnership tiers-specifically, "non-equity" partnership tiers. While such
non-equity partnership structures may take on a number of different forms,
the defining characteristic of such structures involves the creation of a class
or classes of lawyers who lack many of the key attributes of equity
partnership: they do not have liability for debts of the firm, receive a set
compensation instead of a share of the firm's profits, and often (although
not always) lack the power to vote on firm-related issues.'" While some
firms view non-equity partners as remaining permanently outside of the
equity partnership track,' other firms see non-equity partnership as a
stepping-stone to full equity partner status, during which lawyers have the
opportunity to polish their rainmaking skills and adjust to the increased
expectations and duties of partnership.'
Regardless of a firm's specific motivation for implementing this
multi-tiered structure, this structure arguably boosts the profits of equity
partners, since the creation of these "lower" partnership tiers limits the
number of partners who must share in the firm's revenues."' Accordingly,
many law firms believe that this stratification will increase their profits per
188. Evans, supra note 135, at 95 (citation omitted).
189. Evans, supra note 135, at 95 (citing information provided by the National Association for Law
Placement) (citation omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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partner.192 Thus, even before cases like Clackamas and Sidley, a number of
firms already began to shift to this type of multi-tiered structure.193
This multi-tiered partnership structure, however, leads to a number of
significant drawbacks, both for lawyers within a particular firm and for the
legal profession as a whole. First, such a structure can have a negative
impact on firm morale, particular among associates who might view this
format as an "attempt by powerful partners to hoard firm profits."' 94 After
years of slaving away in the name of productivity and profitability,
associates understandably might resent having extra steps added to their
ascension to full equity partnership. In addition, the establishment of a
non-equity partnership tier can undermine opportunities for training and
practice development among lawyers in the non-equity tier, particularly in
firms where income partner status is viewed as an entirely separate track
instead of as a stepping stone to equity partnership. Once a lawyer moves
off of the equity partnership track, many law firms may write him or her
off, providing lower quality assignments and less feedback.' 95
An additional criticism levied against this multi-tiered partnership
structure focuses on the impact of the structure on particular groups.
Observers have criticized some firms for using non-equity partnership to
"weed out existing partners who don't meet certain [financial and/or
professional] criteria,"' often in a manner that revolves around internal
firm politics.'97 Some firms have used non-equity partnership to punish
particular partners,198 or "to hide 'dead-wood' or older partners who simply
have retired in place."' 99 In addition, the creation of partnership tiers
potentially works to the detriment of women and minorities: the number of
192. See Mark Curriden, No Tears for Two Tiers ... More and More Firms are Sure Non-Equity
Partner Slots Benefit Everyone, 20 No. 4 OF COUNSEL 18, 18 (April 2001); see also Lindsay Fortado,
Lawiyer 's Ranks are Growing Again at the Nation 's Biggest Firms; National Law Journal Survey Shows
Increases Across the Board, 182 N.J.L.J. 733 (Nov. 21, 2005) (quoting consultant's view that "law
firms make more money on income partners than on associates or equity partners"); but see William D.
Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84
N.C. LAW REV. 1691 (2006) (challenging the assumption that creation of a two-tier partnership
structure increases profits per partner in a firm).
193. See Henderson, supra note 192, at 1695, 1706 (citations omitted); see also Leigh Jones, New
Partner Class Didn't Grow; Top Firms' Overall Totals Match 2006, Nat'l L.J. I, (Col. 1) (April 9,
2007) (quoting law firm consultant and former law firm chairman's observation that "there is a
continuing trend toward the expansion of nonequity partnership classes as opposed to equity
partnership"); Martha Neil, Brave, supra note 142.
194. See Henderson, supra note 192, at 1707 (citation omitted).
195. Evans, supra note 135, at 97 (citations omitted).
196. Curriden, supra note 192, at 19.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. Notably, in the wake of decisions like Clackamas and Sidley, firms might run into
significant legal problems using non-equity partnership as a potential demotion for older partners seen
as not pulling their weight within the firm. Indeed, this is quite akin to the alleged wrongful conduct
that formed the basis of the EEOC's investigation of and litigation against Sidley.
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female equity partners at two-tiered firms is significantly lower than at
single-tier firms, 20 0 and this disparity exists for minority partners as well,
who likewise tend to be overrepresented in the "income partner" (as
opposed to "equity partner") category within firms that utilize these tiers.20'
Thus, firms may be bolstering their bottom lines at the expense of diversity
and inclusiveness within their leadership ranks-a result that not only
harms those women and minority attorneys who find themselves denied
opportunities for advancement, but also "perpetuates inequality within the
legal profession."202
d. Decrease in associate hiring
Another potential implication of this tension between the need to
increase profits per partner and the legal limits on a firm's ability to reduce
its partnership ranks is that firms simply may begin hiring fewer associates.
As discussed above, the traditional up-or-out structure in firms has assumed
that some percentage of those associates hired each year eventually will
make their way to the top of the firm's hierarchy, attaining the status of
equity partner.20 3 If firms must clamp down on the number of associates
they eventually can elevate to partner in order to maintain the flushness of
their per-partner profits, they may reduce the number of associates that they
hire to begin with. With law school graduates already clamoring for jobs in
the current economic downturn, a further tightening of the job market could
present disastrous consequences for this group of new lawyers.
e. Make cuts in associate training or other important benefits
Finally, firms trying to maintain high profits per partner in the face of
a ballooning number of partners might try to maximize the size of the
firm's profits by cutting costs. One potential source of cost-savings might
be though decreasing the resources devoted to associate training and
development. Large law firms spend an exorbitant amount of money on
associate training.204 Moreover, firms generally do not recoup the costs of
such training immediately, since firms rarely profit from the work of first-
200. See Evans, supra note 136, at 97 (citing 2006:National Association of Women Lawyers,
National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms, 92 NAT'L. WOMEN'S L.J., Oct.
2006, available at http://www.abanet.orgnawl/docs/NAWIFINALPUBLICATION 10-25-
06SURVEYREPORT.pdf.
201. See, e.g., David Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in
Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15, 20 (1999) (citations omitted).
202. Evans, supra note 135, at 94.
203. See supra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
204. Law firms: Legal Problems Trouble for lawyers as deals dry up, ECONOMIST, MAR. 15, 2008,
at 89.
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year associates.205 Any funds diverted from this training and kept within
the firm's general revenues could increase the per-partner profits of the
firm.
This is not a new concern; some believe that firms already have
allowed their focus on the bottom line negatively to affect associate
training.206 In the words of one long-time and experienced litigator, "few if
any private sector associates are gaining any concept of the big picture in
the cases they work on. They are given zounds of projects to work on as
part of a larger group of pyramided lawyers in various matters. But how
many are actually an integral part of any case's litigation team?"207 Yet
while this concern about insufficient associate training is not new, firms
may cut back even further on training if they feel heightened pressure to
maintain or increase their profits per partner amidst limits upon their ability
to trim the size of their partnerships.
In addition to cutting back on associate training, firms might make
additional spending cuts in order to maintain high profits per partner,
reducing the "perks" that they traditionally have granted to associates.
Indeed, firms already have cut back on perks ranging from 401K matching
contributions and firm-provided health insurance coverage, to holiday
parties and taxi usage, to reimbursement for cell phone usage and other
technology.208 While many of these benefits may seem negligible on their
own, they traditionally have been viewed as making life more tolerable for
associates toiling away to "meet their hours," and eliminating such perks
may impact associate morale significantly.20 9
Thus, because decisions like Clackamas and Sidley inhibit firms from
limiting the size of their partnerships through the traditional means of
205. See Daniel Willis, Inner Economist: In Praise of Deferrals, THE DEVIL'S ADVOC., Apr. 22,
2009, available at http://www.the-devils-
advocate.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2009/04/22/49edbe0adle77.
("Law firms rarely if ever make money from the work their first-year associates do. First-
year associates exist to do grunt work. . . and to gain experience so that they can turn into
productive and useful mid-level associates... . Law firms' clients are aware of this, and
they don't like paying to train freshly minted lawyers.").
206. Weltman, supra note 130; see also Zangrilli, supra note 131 (noting that the "[f]ack of 'real
world' legal training haunts most junior associates, who are routinely assigned to tedious document
review projects.").
207. Id.
208. See Rachel Breitman, A Year to Forget Morale Plunged as Midlevels Worried about Whether
They'd Be the Next to Go, or Whether They'd Have Any Work to Do if They Stayed. A Year to Forget,
AM. L. 61 (2009); see also Karen Sloan, Goodbye Perks, Hello Paycuts, RECORDER (SAN FRANCISCO),
April 27, 2009, at I ("Working from home, reducing hours, the type of assignments received,
sabbaticals and technology allowances are among the issues associates are generally more reticent to
raise since the downturn hit.").
209. See Breitman, supra note 208 (quoting associate who complained that "'[t]he firm switched
from serving Starbucks coffee to regular, unbranded coffee. . . . As sad as that is, I miss that the
most!").
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encouraging older partners to leave, firms likely will turn to one or more of
the steps described above to maintain or maximize their profits per partner.
Regrettably, however, each of these steps likely will have its own negative
consequences, both for lawyers within the firm and for the legal profession
more broadly. This does not mean that the courts erred in Clackamas or
Sidley. Strong legal, moral and practical arguments can be made in support
of these two decisions. These arguments, however, would become all the
more powerful if firms were able to abide by the limits that these decisions
place on the treatment of older partners while avoiding some of these other
negative ramifications.
V. FINDING A BALANCE: WAYS THAT FIRMS' PROFITABILITY
CAN COMPLY WITH THE LAW WITHOUT NEGATIVELY
IMPACTING ASSOCIATES, PARTNERS, OR CLIENTS
The finding that many law firm partners might fall within the
protections of the ADEA need not always lead to the negative
consequences described in Part III. Firms do not necessarily have to
choose between watching their bottom lines plummet due to a larger
partnership pool and creating a working environment of higher billable
hours, less training, and less opportunity for attorneys. Rather, firms
willing to explore creative solutions to address this new reality of increased
protection for older partners not only can avoid these undesirable results,
but also might accrue many unanticipated gains.
Firms contemplating a response to Clackamas and Sidley generally
may choose between one of two paths: Firms either might explore ways to
trim the size of their partnerships (including by eliminating some older
partners) in a manner that will not violate the ADEA, or firms might
examine ways to keep older lawyers in the firm and to utilize such lawyers
in a manner that maximizes profits. Both of these paths are considered
below.
A. APPROACHES FOR DECREASING PARTNERSHIP SIZE BY ELIMINATING
SOME OLDER PARTNERS
Firms that wish to maintain or maximize their profits per partner in the
wake of Clackamas and Sidley might look for methods for limiting the size
of their partnerships, including by eliminating some older partners, without
running afoul of the ADEA. Firms adopting this approach would have
several options.
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1. Terminate Partners Using Criteria Unrelated to Age
Nothing within the ADEA prohibits employers from terminating or
encouraging the retirement of older employers for reasons unrelated to age.
Thus, firms wishing to trim their partnerships of less productive partners
could do so under the frameworks established in Clackamas and Sidley,
even if the partners targeted for elimination were over 40 years old. So
long as firms did not make such decisions based upon the age of the
individuals in question, firms would not run afoul of the ADEA.
One logical manner in which firms could adopt this approach would
be to create clear and objective criteria for determining the retention of all
partners in the firm, regardless of age. Such criteria could include
requirements regarding the generation of business; the imposition of some
minimum billable hours; obligations with respect to the training and
mentoring of younger attorneys; or other presumably measurable criteria.
The ABA, in calling for the elimination of mandatory retirement in law
firms, has advocated for precisely this type of approach, asserting that "a
senior partner can and should be evaluated individually in accordance with
his or her unique attributes and interests and the firm's generally applicable
performance criteria, including the full range of strategic and tactical legal
abilities and lawyering skills."2 10
From one perspective, both lawyers and the firms in which they work
might have much to gain from the establishment of such clear and objective
expectations. One common complaint about law firm partnership
determinations relates to the obscurity that often surrounds such
decisions.2 1' Adding transparency and clarity to this process might
alleviate the stress that lawyers feel regarding these partnership decisions-
both among associates waiting for elevation to partnership and among
existing partners who feel unease regarding the lack of permanency of their
status.
Yet the establishment of such criteria likely would be no easy task:
How much new business should a law firm require? What number of
billable hours would be sufficient? Different members of firm
management may have vastly different views regarding the "right" answer
to such questions. Moreover, while a focus on "objective" criteria would
reduce firms' exposure, some firm decision-makers might bristle at the
exclusion of more intangible factors such as one's service to the firm,
capacity for teamwork, positive attitude, or camaraderie with clients.
210. ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at 12.
211. See,e.g.,Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1667 (observing that law firms "seel to conceal -
pr more often, to reveal selectively - both the rules and the criteria [for making partner]"); cf Wilkins,
Partner Schmartner!, supra note 17, at 1272 (observing that the establishment of clearer and more
objective performance standards particularly would be "welcome news . .. to women and minority
lawyers who often find themselves disadvantaged by the unwritten rules that still govern most firms").
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Allowing these less measurable, subjective factors to weigh into a decision
increases the possibility for allegations of age bias. Yet to the extent that
the firm truly values such intangible contributions by partners, eliminating
them from the evaluation of a partner's continued prospects for retention
would exclude important elements from the firm's calculations.
2. Increase the Amount of Power and Control Exercised by Partners in
the Firm
Perhaps the key to the court's finding that the demoted Sidley partners
might qualify as employees for purposes of the ADEA was the relative lack
of power and control that such partners exercised within the firm,
particularly in comparison to the firms' influential Management and
Executive Committees. ' But Sidley made clear that not all partners
should be seen as employees for purposes of the ADEA. "True" partners-
those with sufficient authority in the firm-would remain outside of this
statute's protections. 2 13 Thus, firms that wish to exclude partners from the
protections of the ADEA (i.e., that wish to ensure that courts view such
partners as owners and not as employees) might increase the power that
such partners can exercise within the firm, giving such partners more of a
voice within the firm's management. However, this solution also would
present a host of problems for a firm. First, while the courts in Clackamas
and Sidley emphasized the importance of a lawyer's power and control in
determining whether he or she should qualify as an employee for purposes
of the ADEA, nowhere did the courts articulate precisely how much control
would be required to render the lawyer a "true" partner in the firm.2 14 Even
more fundamentally, this approach of increasing partners' "voice" within a
firm to place them outside of the ADEA seems impractical at best and
futile at worst: The more power given to partners within a large firm-
particularly a firm with hundreds of partners-the more the firm runs into
the very logistical problems that have spurred firms like Sidley to create
hierarchical committee structures. It simply is not practical to run any large
business (law firm or otherwise) by seeking the input of hundreds of
individuals every time the business wishes to make an important
decision.215 Moreover, taken to its logical conclusion, this concept of
increasing a partner's power to exclude him/her from the ADEA might
hinder a firm's ability to terminate the partner: the more power and control
212. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
213. See Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d at 707.
214. See Bettina B. Plevan & Jennifer B. Wang, When Is a Partner Not a Partner, N.Y. L.J., May
22, 2006 (observing that "[tihe nation's large law firms continue to lack clear guidance as to the extent
to which and under what circumstances their partners could be viewed as employees for purposes of
anti-discrimination and other employment laws.").
215. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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the partner obtains, the greater his/her ability to override any policy that
would lead to his/her termination.216
Finally, firms could try to increase partners' voices within the firm by
adopting something akin to a shareholder proxy method for making firm
decisions. Specifically, firms could form management committees similar
to that which Sidley utilized, but could require members of the
management committee to act in a representative capacity with respect to
other partners in the firm, seeking permission from non-committee-member
partners to vote on their behalf. This method would allow for fairly smooth
firm operations by still limiting the number of participants in the decision-
making process without leaving non-committee-member partners entirely
stripped of any voice or control over firm operations.
However, this proposal remains problematic for many of the same
reasons discussed above. Given the lack of guidance regarding the amount
of control necessary to render someone a "true partner" for purposes of the
ADEA, this "power by proxy" to non-committee-member partners might
not provide enough control to render them "true partners" in the firm.217
Moreover, this approach would create its own practical problems: Some
partners might not agree to this form of proxy representation and instead
might demand an active voice in firm decisions, leading to the familiar
concern regarding too many individuals trying to weigh in on firm
business.218
3. Contractually Restrict the Length of Partnership Tenure Based Upon
Non-Age-Related Criteria
An additional option that firms could explore to limit the number of
partners in their ranks would be establishing contractual limits on the
length of partnership tenure. Firms could include within their partnership
agreements a requirement that all partners retire (or move to a non-equity
status) after a certain number of years as equity partners. This provision
would not mandate retirement or demotion at any particular age, but rather
would trigger after a partner had held his/her position for some number of
years, regardless of his/her age at that time. Such a provision would ensure
216. One related approach would be for firms to treat each practice group within the firm as its own
separate partnership, thus with the firm as a whole thus functioning as a "partnership of partnerships."
Judge Easterbrook raised this idea in his concurrence in Sidley. See Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315
F.3d at 710 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). From this perspective, individual partners might be seen as
having greater control and authority over this smaller, "practice group partnership," and thus might be
seen as a "true" partner in this context. However, firms still would face the problem of coordinating the
decisions and policies of these mini-firms, likely requiring some sort of centralized management
structure. The more powerful this centralized management structure, the more likely courts would be to
view these partners as subordinate "employees" for purposes of the ADEA.
217. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
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consistent turnover within a firm's partnership ranks while not necessarily
focusing only on the oldest partners in the firm.
One obvious objection to this type of provision would be the age-
based effect that it would have on firm partners. Affected partners might
argue that this limitation according to "years of service" was nothing more
than a proxy for age discrimination, and thus constituted intentional,
disparate treatment discrimination under the ADEA.21 9 Guidance from the
EEOC supports the idea that an employment policy based upon "years of
service" can constitute disparate treatment age discrimination.220 However,
recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court seem to have undercut this
view, holding that disparate treatment discrimination arises only when age
does more than simply play a role in some adverse employment action, but
in fact serves as the "but for cause" of such adverse action. In Kentucky
Retirement Systems v. EEOC, for example, the Court acknowledged that
pension status which depends upon years of service typically will "go hand
in hand with age,"22' but characterized these two concepts as "analytically
distinct." Accordingly, the Court held that to prevail in an age
discrimination claim, a plaintiff must establish that any differences in
treatment were "'actually motivated' by age."222
Even if a provision within the partnership agreement linking
retirement to years of service did not constitute intentional, disparate
treatment age discrimination, a court might find that such a provision
would give rise to a claim of disparate impact discrimination.22 3 While this
type of "years of service" trigger for retirement might be neutral on its face
with respect to any age-based animus, it undoubtedly would impact older
partners more significantly than younger partners, since older partners
almost certainly would reach such service limits prior to their younger
peers. Firms attempting to avoid disparate impact liability thus would have
to demonstrate that this retirement requirement was based upon a
219. The ADEA bars employers from engaging in intentional discrimination on the basis of age
(i.e., "disparate treatment" discrimination), as well as unintentional "disparate impact" discrimination,
where a policy that is neutral on its face has a disparate impact on older works. See Smith v. City of
Jackson, Mississippi, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
220. See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 31, at § 2-11(3) (stating that "[a]n employment
action based solely on an individual's years of service constitutes disparate treatment under the ADEA
where years of service is a proxy for age") (emphasis in original).
221. Kentucky Retirement Sys. v. EEOC, U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2366-67 (2008) (citing Hazan
Paper Co. v. Biggins. 507 U.S. 604 (1993)).
222. Id. at 2367 (citing Hazen Paper Co., supra note 221); see also Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
U.S., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009) (citations omitted) (applying standards from Kentucky Retirement
Systems and Hazen Paper Co. to mixed-motive age discrimination case and stating that a plaintiff in a
mixed-motive age discrimination case must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that age was
the "but-for" cause of the contested employer action).
223. See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 31, at § 2-11(3) (observing that an employment
action based upon years of service "may also be unlawful if it has a disparate impact based on age")
(emphasis in original).
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"reasonable factor other than age "RFOA"224 Specifically, in trying to
justify a "years of service" limit on partnership, a firm not only would have
to establish that this limitation turned upon a "non-age" factor, but also
would have the burden of persuading the court that this was a reasonable
criteria for limiting partnership tenure,22 and many firms might have
difficulty satisfying this burden.226
4. Establish Incentives Such as Succession Plans to Encourage Partners to
Retire and/or Transition Work to Younger Lawyers
Finally, firms could encourage turnover among older partners without
mandatory retirement by utilizing "succession plans" for the transitioning
of work.227 Such plans could take a number of different forms, from
providing for the assignment of certain clients to younger lawyers; to
including younger lawyers in significant transactions or cases; to
encouraging mentoring between older and younger attorneys.228 These
succession plans not only might increase a firm's profits per partner by
facilitating the retirement of older partners, but also could have other long-
term benefits for a firm, such as providing better service to clients and
giving younger attorneys important work experiences.229
One potential complication with this approach, however, is that it
requires older partners willingly to participate. The smooth transition of
work from an older partner to a younger attorney will require the
cooperation of both of these parties. Firms could tailor their succession
224. The ADEA creates an exemption for employer actions otherwise barred by the statute if such
actions were "based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
225. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (holding that the
RFOA exemption is an affirmative defense on which the employer will bear the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion, and noting that "[t]he focus of the defense is that the factor relied upon
was a 'reasonable' one for the employer to be using.").
226. Related to this idea of contractually limiting the duration of an individual's status as an equity
partner, firms could specify within their partnership agreements that a partner's equity in the firm (and,
therefore, his or her share of the profits) gradually would decline over time once the partner reached a
specified age. Such a provision might encourage older partners to leave the firm by making it less
financially advantageous to remain, without actively forcing partners to leave. However, the ADEA not
only bars employers from terminating protected employees on the basis of age, but also prohibits
employers from taking other "adverse actions" against protected employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
Reducing an employee's compensation constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of the
ADEA. See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 31, at § 2-ll(B)(1). Accordingly, firms utilizing
this strategy would face the same concerns regarding liability for disparate treatment and/or disparate
impact age discrimination as firms attempting to terminate equity partnership status after a set number
of years.
227. Stem, supra note 165, at 1110 (citation omitted).
228. Id. at 1110 (citations omitted); Goldberg, supra note 115, at 3.
229. See Goldberg, supra note 115, at 3 (noting that firms "pi[n order for up-and-comers to be the
primary client contact or lead trial counsel, they need folks who have had their shot to move
aside. . .. ").
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plans to the individual partners involved, including by having older
partners work to create the terms of their departures from the firm.230 In
addition, to induce older partners to embrace this approach, a firm could
provide additional compensation to those partners who engage in this type
of conduct.21' The Chicago firm Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP has
utilized this option, eschewing a mandatory retirement policy and instead
"compensate[ing] partners who transition their work to the next generation
at a 'premium.' 23 2 Ultimately, however, the viability of this approach will
turn upon older partners' willingness to transition work to younger partners
in their firm.
B. APPROACHES FOR KEEPING OLDER PARTNERS AND UTILIZING THEIR
SKILLS AND RESOURCES
While firms might adopt one or more of the approaches described
above to trim their partnerships by eliminating older partners, each of these
options involves significant legal and/or practical concerns. Moreover,
even if firms could navigate these legal and practical difficulties, these
strategies provide a short-term solution for a structural problem. If an
increasing number of partners continue to work well into their later years,
and if profits per partner remain a key indicator of law firm success, firms
at some point will have to find a more constructive approach for remaining
profitable despite an ever-increasing pool of partners. Thus, while some
firms may try to balance the requirements of Clackamas and Sidley against
their desire for high profits per partner by encouraging older partners to
retire, other firms might adopt the better approach of retaining older
partners and making good use of the resources and experience that such
lawyers can provide.
1. Use Older Partners to Train New Associates
One common observation among law firms regarding incoming
associates is that new associates tend to "cost" the firm money for the first
few months or years of the associates' practice. 233 New lawyers frequently
230. Id.
231. Stem, supra note 165, at 1110. (citation omitted).
232. Id. (citations omitted).
233. See E. Joan Blum & Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Teaching in Practice: Legal Writing Faculty as
Expert Writing Consultants to Law Firms, 60 MERCER L. REV. 761, 768 (2009). ("Although law
schools in general have increasingly incorporated practice skills into their curricula, an expectation that
a new law school graduate will be ready to practice law 'right out of the box' is unrealistic") (citations
omitted). Many law schools have begun to address this shortcoming by developing curricula that
provide law students with practical skills and experience. See, e.g., Robert Seibel, The STEPPS
Program Introduces Law Students to Real-World Lawyering, THE COMPLETE LAW., July 2008 (online
publication, link no longer available; article on file with the author) (describing program launched by
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graduate from law school indoctrinated with the skill of "thinking like a
lawyer," but rarely possess the practical skills or experience to allow them
to hit the ground running as a functioning attorney. Accordingly, partners
in large firms often must "write off" many working hours spent by new
associates who make errors on or bill excessive time to a project.234 With
better training, these young lawyers more quickly could become profitable
members of the firm.
However, associates often have trouble obtaining the training that they
need to become productive members of the firm. While the firm has an
incentive to ensure that all associates receive adequate training, individual
firm partners frequently have "suboptimal incentives" to contribute to
provide training to associates."23 5 Any time that a partner spends training a
younger attorney detracts from his/her all-important billable time.236 While
a partner may have the incentive to train an associate who works
predominately for him/her, most associates work for multiple partners,
meaning that no single partner may have an incentive to expend precious
time on training an associate.237 Thus, while many firms laud the training
and mentoring that they provide to young associates, the facts on the
ground indicate that such rhetoric frequently does not amount to much
actual training.23 8
One potential solution to this lack of training in firms involves
harnessing the skills and experiences of older lawyers. These more
seasoned attorneys possess a wealth of knowledge that could provide
substantial benefits to new attorneys.239 In addition, unlike younger
partners who may be focused on generating business and on building their
client portfolios, some older partners may wish to move on from the
competitive, "rainmaking" aspect of the practice and instead use their vast
legal skills in some other capacity . Firms could create additional
California Western School of Law which incorporates lawyering skills, ethics and professionalism); see
also Amir Efrati, How Obscure Law School Places Grads at Top Firms, THE WALL ST. J., May 23,
2007, at BI (describing efforts by University of Detroit Mercy Law School to revamp third year
curriculum by creating courses that simulate real-life practice).
234. See Blum & Vinson, supra note 233, at FN 25 (observing that "a law firm that hires a first-year
associate for $160,000, plus signing bonuses, should expect to write off fifty to a hundred percent of a
first-year associate's research billings") (citations omitted).
235. Wilkens & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1617.
236. Id.; see also supra notes 145-52, 181-83 and accompanying text (discussing pressure on
partners to maintain high billable hours).
237. Id. (citations omitted).
238. See Efrati, supra note 233, at BI (noting that many firms "have long complained that law
school devotes too much attention to theory and leaves students unprepared to practice. . ."); see also
supra Part II.A.2.
239. See Thorsen, supra note 129, at 34 (describing potential for older lawyers to act as "master
lawyers who bring senior expertise and skill to the projects of other lawyers, firms, and corporations on
a consulting, temporary basis"); (characterizing older lawyers as "masters of their craft, mentors, and
sages in the tradition of the 'wise elder. . . .'). Id.
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incentives for older lawyers to take on this task. The most obvious way in
which firms could create such incentives is by valuing the time that older
lawyers spend on such training: Instead of training time vanishing into the
pool of "worthless," non-billable time, firms could track the time spent by
partners on training and credit such time in calculating such partners'
compensation. To the extent that such training time allows younger
associates more quickly to become profitable to the firm, the hours spent
training arguably produce as much "value" to the firm as would traditional,
billable hours. By giving such hours substantial weight in calculating
partners' compensation, the firm more readily could incentivize older
partners to allocate time to this training.240
2. Encourage Older Partners to Engage in Public Interest Work on Behalf
of the Firm
In addition to using older firm partners to train new associates, firms
also could utilize the skills of experiences of older partners to satisfy the
firm's pro bono obligations. While this strategy may result only in indirect
financial benefits for a firm, it may garner other significant firm-wide
advantages.
The United States currently suffers from a dramatic shortage of public
interest lawyers. In fact, the entire pool of legal services for the poor in this
country has been estimated to comprise approximately 6,000 full-time
equivalent lawyers-a mere seven-tenths of 1% of all American lawyers.24'
While the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that every
lawyer should perform at least 50 hours of pro bono work per year, 242
private attorneys in recent years frequently have failed to satisfy this
standard, often due to the increased pressure to maintain high billable
hours. 243 Accordingly, the ABA recently reported that four out of five poor
individuals currently lack access to legal representation.244
At the same time, as noted above, the United States possesses a
substantial (and growing) number of older lawyers.2 45  By 2011,
approximately one-quarter of the nation's one million attorneys will be
over the age of 65.246 If a mere 5% of the practicing attorneys over the age
240. The ABA seemed to contemplate this approach in recommending that firms eliminate
mandatory retirement, suggesting that "the willingness to involve other lawyers in [client relationships]
and transition to others" should be among the various criteria used to evaluate a partner's status at a
firm. See ABA Recommendation, supra note 100, at 12.
241. Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 115, at 1103 (referring to the poor/public interest
sector of the legal profession as "vanishingly small").
242. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
243. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at 327.
244. Id. at 328 (citation omitted).
245. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
246. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at FN 7 (citing article in National Law Journal); see also
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of 65 devoted their practices to public service legal work, it would double
the number of attorneys primarily performing public interest work by
2011.247
One question, therefore, is how best to match this demand for public
service legal work with the growing supply of experienced attorneys in this
country-and more importantly from the perspective of large firms, how to
do so in a way that might create some financial or other business
advantages. Over a decade ago, Professor Galanter proposed a program for
achieving this feat. After acknowledging many of the challenges faced by
older lawyers in the modem legal market, 248 Galanter proposed a "Second
'Public Service' Career" for older lawyers, in which senior attorneys could
transition from purely private-practice careers into careers focused on
providing legal services to the poor.2 49 While Galanter described various
formats for implementing this type of program, one option could allow a
partner to remain with his/her firm and work as part of the firm's pro bono
department. 250 According to Galanter, this approach "would enable firms
to fulfill their pro bono obligations while providing an attractive post-
retirement option for partners."25 1
From one perspective, the implementation of this type of "second
career" program would not entirely solve the financial dilemma that many
firms face: if such "pro bono partners" remained equity partners in the firm,
they still would take a share of the firm's precious profits, thus still
decreasing profits per partner. Arguably, however, such partners would
create other benefits for the firm-some of which might themselves have a
positive impact on the firm's bottom line. For example, the pro bono
matters on which these partners would work could present fantastic training
opportunities for young lawyers in the firm, something which could benefit
a firm financially.252 Moreover, a strong pro bono commitment could serve
as a significant marketing tool for a firm, both in wooing clients and
recruiting new associates.253 Indeed, many law firms have realized that
maintaining a commitment to pro bono work plays an important role in
recruiting new attorneys, since many law students take this criterion into
Thorsen, supra note 129, at 34 (noting that "[t]he first of 77 million baby boomers turn 60 in 2006.
They are on the front edge of the largest, healthiest, best education population of Americans ever to
move through and beyond their fifties. . . .") (citation omitted).
247. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at I (citations omitted).
248. Galanter, Old and in the Way, supra note 116, at 1094-95.
249. Id. at 1102.
250. id. at 1106-07.
251. Id
252. Supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text; see also Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at
328.
253. George B. Cauthen, A Duty to Serve, 15 NO. 3 PROF. LAW. 22 (2004) (observing that lawyers
may perform pro bono work as a marketing vehicle or to improve public relations, and that "[s]ome
firms cite pro bono as a major factor in recruiting. . . .").
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account when deciding whether to work for a firm.254
Finally, by keeping partners within the firm while they perform these
pro bono functions, a "second career" program could eliminate costs
associated with partner attrition. One significant expense incurred by
corporate law firms relates to the costs associated with turnover among
attorneys.255 These transition costs not only accrue when younger attorneys
leave the firm, but also when older lawyers retire from the practice. Firms
that support these types of "second career' programs for older lawyers,
particularly where the older attorney remains associated with the firm, "can
create an intermediate status between partnership and retirement....
Because participating lawyers will continue to have a regular presence in
the office, they can maintain contact with clients whose work is being
transitioned to younger lawyers, while making themselves available for
consultation by such younger lawyers when questions arise.257
Finally, this type of program seems likely to benefit those partners
who choose to participate. Many law students commence law school with
the idea of doing public interest work after graduation, only to find at the
end of three years that their crushing debt load at least temporarily
precludes such a career path.258 For many of these individuals, the "golden
handcuffs" of private practice eventually may eclipse any plan of entering
the public interest legal arena. Yet as partners near "retirement age," their
law school loans undoubtedly have long been paid off, and their years of
earning a substantial income with the firm presumably have left many of
them with significant savings. Such lawyers thus may find themselves
ideally positioned to pursue the more idealistic legal practice that appealed
to them so many years ago.
A recent survey conducted by The Pro Bono Institute ("PBI") 259
presents promising data with respect to the potential benefits of this type of
254. Helaine M. Barnett, 2004 Bellwood Lecture at the Univ. of Idaho, Justice for All: Are We
Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 403, 421 (2005) (noting that "[m]any large private law firms
have realized that developing a significant pro bono practice is an important factor in recruiting, as
many law students consider it in choosing a law firm.").
255. Rachelle J. Canter, Turnover: What can you do to keep good lawyers, 25 LAw PRAC. MGMT.
(May/June 1999) (estimating the costs of lawyer turnover to be up to two and a half times an
individual's salary, and noting that clients share this financial burden); American Bar Association, ABA
Commission on Billable Hours Report 2001-2002, at 7 (on file with author) ("When an associate leaves
a firm and a new associate is assigned to a file, the client may end up paying for the hours involved in
getting the new associate up to speed.").
256. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at 328.
257. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at 328.
258. Barnett, supra note 254, at 425 (citations omitted) (discussing the "burden of law school debt
on lawyers wanting to pursue careers in public service.").
259. The Pro Bono Institute is a non-profit organization housed at Georgetown University Law
Center which explores and identifies approaches for addressing the provision of legal services to the
poor, disadvantaged, and others unable to secure legal aid. See Pro Bono Institute,
http://www.probonoinst.orglabout.php (last visited Aug. 23 2009).
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program. Specifically, this PBI survey examined the results of its
previously launched Second Acts ProjectsM, which had been aimed at
supporting transitioning and retired attorneys who were interested in
pursuing second careers in public interest law.2 60 The survey focused on
large law firms and sought to gather information regarding the firms'
retirement practices, existing programs for transitioning attorneys into
retirement, and existing policies regarding pro bono work.2 6' In addition,
the survey inquired regarding the likely interest of both the firms and their
senior attorneys in participating in a Second Acts program, and asked about
the advantages and/or problems that respondents foresaw with such
programs.262 While the survey included a fairly limited number of
263participants, most respondents expressed positive views when asked both
whether their senior attorneys might be interested in participating in this
type of program and whether their firms might be interested in
implementing such a program.264 While such results may be little more
than a preliminary indication regarding the benefits of this type of program,
they present one more potential option for older partners and for the firms
in which they work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even before the decisions in Clackamas and Sidley, law firms-and
particularly large firms-struggled with the potentially conflicting demands
of creating opportunities for associates to make partner, while maintaining
sizable profits to share among the firm partners. By indicating that older
partners might fall within the protections of the ADEA, the courts in these
two cases further limited the options available to firms trying to reconcile
these competing interests.
Various recent developments within the legal community and within
society more broadly have exacerbated the potential impact of these
decisions. Firms must deal with a growing pool of older partners who do
not want to nor can afford to retire, and cannot be forced to leave the firm.
As an increasing number of law school graduates elect to begin their
careers at large law firms,265 firms may find themselves more pressed than
260. Id.
261. Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 126, at 330-32.
262. Id. at 329-31.
263. PBI received responses from forty-five of the 150 firms surveyed. All respondents were
relatively large law firms, varying in size from 50 to 1,598 attorneys. The primary offices of
responding firms were located in a variety of metropolitan areas, including Los Angeles, Salt Lake City,
St. Louis, Chicago, New York, and Washington D.C. Id. at 331-32.
264. Id. at 337-41.
265. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 119, at 1869 (citations omitted) (characterizing large
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ever to make room for these new associates eventually to become partners.
Moreover, the emphasis on profits per partner as a key measure of success
shows no signs of abating. To the contrary, as economic conditions
worsen, firms may find themselves straining even further to present an
image of a rosy bottom line. In short, many firms may find that long-held
structures for the management of their firms simply no longer work. Firms
thus might have to adopt any number of changes to their internal structures
and practices in order to comply with the requirements of the ADEA as
articulated by the courts in Clackamas and Sidley while remaining
profitable and productive business entities.
Whether firms will succeed in making these changes remains to be
seen. Although this article suggests possible steps that large firms could
take to maintain sufficiently high per partner profits despite a steadily
growing partnership pool, not every firm may be able to make these
adjustments. Some large firms instead may crumble under their own
weight and size. In all likelihood, the firms that will survive and perhaps
thrive in this new environment will be those which do not simply try to get
rid of older partners in the firm, but which instead endeavor to take
advantage of the vast skills, contacts and experience that these more
seasoned lawyers can provide.
firm private practice as "the fastest-growing, most prosperous, and most dynamic sector of the
profession.").
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